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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICKY ANGILAU, 
Appellant/Defendant 
Case No. 20090538 
gNCARCERATED^ 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 (3)(hy provides this Court's jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal from a criminal case involving a first degree felony charge. The 
petition for interlocutory appeal was timely filed on June 29, 2009 (R. 450) from the trial 
court's June 15, 2009 order denying the motion to dismiss (R. 439-445). 
ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Is the direct file statute, under which sixteen-year-old Angilau stands charged with 
murder in adult court, unconstitutional? 
Standard of Review: Angilau challenges the district court's legal conclusions, which 
are entitled to no deference on appeal, but are reviewed for correctness. See, e,g,, In re 
Adoption of B.W.G.. 2007 UT App 278, If 4, 167 P.3d 1099. Statutes are presumed 
!With the exception of the 1993 version of the direct file statute at issue in State v. 
Mohi 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), the 2009 versions of all statutes are at issue here and 
copied in the addendum. 
constitutional, and parties challenging their constitutionality bear the burden. See, e.g., 
Merrill v. Utah Labor Com'n, 2009 UT 26,1J 5, 2009 WL 1098294. 
Preservation: Counsel for Angilau preserved the issue in a motion to dismiss and 
supporting memorandum (R. 28-56), a reply memorandum (R. 78-405), and oral argument 
(R. 4/'6/2009, passim). Angilau also filed a petition for emergency extraordinary relief in this 
Court in Angilau v. Winder et aL Case No. 20090457-SC raising the statutory challenge (E.g. 
446-48).2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The controlling constitutional provisions and statutes are in Addendum D. 
2Counsel for Angilau believe that the issue was properly preserved. Out of an 
abundance of caution, however, they assert that the issue and subissues before the Court 
would merit full resolution under the plain error and extraordinary circumstances doctrines 
in the event of inadvertent waivers by counsel. Courts utilize the extraordinary 
circumstances doctrine in cases involving '"rare procedural anomalies/" as a '"safety device'" 
to avoid manifest injustice. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong 
may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight 
than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 
(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate 
for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 
1138,1140 (10th Or.), cert, denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
As is demonstrated herein, the direct file statute and trial court's legal analysis in 
upholding it so deviate from well-established constitutional norms and rules of statutory 
construction, and so prejudice Angilau as to merit full relief on appeal under both these 
doctrines. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Angilau by information with murder, a first degree felony, 
obstructing justice, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, both second degree felonies, and 
possessing a firearm in school, a class A misdemeanor (R. 1-2). The court declared him 
indigent (R. 7). 
Angilau moved to dismiss the information on the basis that the direct file statute 
underpinning district court jurisdiction is unconstitutional (R. 28-56). The State opposed the 
motion (R. 58-77), Angilau replied (R. 78-405), and the court heard argument (R. 406; T. 
4/6/2009 at 1-34). While the case was under advisement in the trial court, this Court 
denied Angilau's petition for emergency extraordinary relief (R. 448). The trial court denied 
the motion to dismiss and upheld the constitutionality of the direct file statute (R. 439-445). 
The Court granted this interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss. 
The Court declined to consolidate this appeal with Angilau's related direct appeal challenging 
the legality of his incarceration in the adult jail, Angilau v. Winder, Case No. 20090677, but 
did recall that appeal from the court of appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts underlying the offenses charged have yet to be presented under oath in a 
preliminary hearing or trial. The probable cause statement included in the information, 
3 
alleges: 
On January 21, 2009, in Salt Lake County at Kearns High School, 
RICKY ANGILAU and another juvenile male, E.F. ran into each other in the 
hall and agreed to meet off school property to fight at 5533 South Red Lodge 
Drive. The location of the fight and the shooting is within 1000 feet of 
Kearns High School. While walking to the fight location, RICKY ANGILAU 
showed a juvenile friend that he had a gun in his waistband under his shirt. 
RICKY ANGILAU and E.F. started to fight each other RICKY ANGILAU 
pulled out a gun and fired one shot into the air. RICKY ANGILAU then 
lowered the gun pointing it at a group of people and fired one shot at the 
group. The bullet struck Esteban Manuel Saidi in the lower abdomen and he 
fell to the ground. Esteban Saidi was taken to the Intermountain Medical 
Center and pronounced dead several hours later from his injuries. An autopsy 
by Dr. Todd Grey of the Utah Office of the Medical Examiner determined the 
cause of death to be a gunshot wound, and the manner of death to be 
homicide. 
The post-Miranda statement of RICKY ANGILAU that he exchanged 
words with E.F. and decided to fight each other. They went to an agreed 
upon location and began to fight with a group of students gathered around the 
combatants. RICKY ANGILAU indicated that he began to tire and pulled the 
pistol out of his pocket and fired one time into the air. He intentionally pulled 
the trigger again while pointing the gun straight ahead in the direction of a 
group of individuals. He saw one of the students stumble and fall to the 
ground. He then fled to a friend's house. RICKY ANGILAU stated he ran to 
the friend's house he threw the pistol over the fence of one of the houses he 
passed. 
[Sic] (R. 3-4).3 
On January 26, 2009, the District Attorney explained the basis of the decision to 
prosecute sixteen-year-old Angilau in adult court, in a widely televised and published press 
conference, wherein she stated, 
3Counsel for Angilau do not concede the accuracy of the probable cause statement, 
but include it here to summarize the evidence the State apparently hopes to produce to 
support the charges. 
4 
At 16 years old, because of his participation in a gang and the activities 
that he engaged in on this particular day, he now faces the potential of 
spending the rest of his life in prison. 
See R. 85, 236037. See also, e.g., 
http.V/www.ksl.com/?sid:=:5424474&autostart=y&nid=148. 
The District Attorney's belief that Angilau is a gang member or participant, which 
materially influenced the choice to file the case directly in adult court, see id., was erroneous. 
Angilau is not a gang member and has not participated in a gang.4 Rather, prior to his arrest 
and incarceration in the adult jail, Angilau was physically active in sports, working hard at 
school, and participated regularly in family, scouting and church activities (E.g., R. 216-233, 
545; T. 9/14/2009 at 5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Our juvenile courts serve compelling interests in rehabilitating children and 
strengthening families. The decision to prosecute a child in adult court is a drastic and 
important one requiring due process of law, which cannot constitutionally be left to the 
unbridled discretion of a prosecutor. 
The current direct file statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701, provides no guidance 
4Counsel for Angilau sought evidence that Angilau is in a gang through subpoenas to 
the Salt Lake City Police Department and the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Metro Gang Unit 
on May 14, 2009 (R. 421-24), and through a discovery request to the prosecution on May 
20, 2009 (R 425-28). As of the September 14, 2009 hearing on the motion to release 
Angilau from Pretrial Services, no such evidence had been produced (T. 9/14/2009 at 13). 
5 
for prosecutors' discretion to file such cases in adult court by way of information or 
indictment, or in juvenile court by petition. The statute bears the same constitutional flaw as 
the direct file statute stricken on constitutional grounds in State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 
1995), Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6)(b) (1993). In fact, the prosecutorial discretion under 
the current statute is greater than that at issue in Mohi, because there is no longer a recall 
hearing and no direct appeal from the decision to charge in adult court under the current 
direct file statute. The direct file statute runs afoul of several state and federal constitutional 
provisions discussed herein, primarily because it serve no legitimate purpose, and dis-serves 
the codified purposes of the Juvenile Court Act of which it is a part. 
The trial court's analysis upholding the direct file statute violates basic tenets of 
statutory construction and constitutional law. Contrary to the court's reasoning, the post-
Mohi amendments to the statute do not alleviate the unconstitutional prosecutorial discretion 
addressed in Mohi. Rather, they augment it. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order, strike the direct file statute on 
constitutional grounds, and order the case dismissed from the adult court. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. JUVENILE COURTS SERVE COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS 
IN MEETING THE UNIQUE DEVELOPMENTAL NEEDS OF 
CHILDREN. 
It has long been recognized that an inherent element of civilized society is its 
6 
provision for its children. In re Tanner. 549 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1976). Our juvenile courts 
exist in order to serve the public interest in meeting the special developmental needs of 
children. Anderson v. Anderson. 416 P.2d 308, 309-310 (Utah 1966). 
Scientific and sociological studies demonstrate that the brains of adolescent children 
are not yet fully developed, particularly in the frontal lobes, which control decision-making. 
By reviewing the amicus briefs filed in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), included in 
the record at R. 120-200, this Court may confirm that children who are under the age of 
eighteen have brains which are not yet developed, and as a result, they lack the ability to 
control their emotions and impulses, anticipate the consequences of their actions, accurately 
perceive risks to themselves or others, accurately gage the impact of their acts and responses, 
or to make reasoned choices of behavior. See R. 137-145, 180-197. Because of their 
undeveloped brains, children of this age are not equipped to understand their rights, assist in 
their own defense or make the decisions required in adult prosecutions. Rather, they often 
make choices, such as confessing falsely to serious crimes during interrogation or 
confabulating details consistent with false confessions, which undermine the reliability of the 
outcome of adult prosecutions. See id. and R. 160-63. Because of their undeveloped brains, 
children are far less likely than adults to be deterred by statutes. See R. 137-47, 136-153. 
After reviewing the studies, our Supreme Court has recognized that children have an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack maturity, and thus often take impetuous and 
reckless actions and make decisions without thorough consideration. Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). Adolescents are less likely to restrain their impulses, understand 
7 
the perspectives of others, and consider alternative actions. Id. Children's poor choices and 
actions are influenced by their impressionable nature and their vulnerability to peer pressure 
and other negative influences. Id. They have less control over their environments, or less 
experience controlling their environments, than adults do, and their character traits are also 
less well-formed than adults'. Id. Children are more vulnerable than adults to psychological 
damage. Id. at 569-70. 
The biological and developmental differences in children lead to reasonable 
conclusions that children's misbehaviors are especially worthy of forgiveness, and that their 
characters are possible to redeem and reform. Roper at 569-70. The vast majority of 
children who engage in illegal and risky behaviors as adolescents grow out of them as they 
become adults. Id. 
Accordingly, just as we limit the privileges and responsibilities given to children (e.g. 
voting, marrying without parental consent, serving on juries), we limit children's liability for 
what would be criminal behavior in adults. Even for the most heinous of capital murders, 
we recognize that children do not weigh their actions prior to taking them as adults do, and 
thus their misbehavior is not as morally reprehensible. See id.. See also, Thompson v. 
Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815, 835-38 (1988) {plurality). As our scientific and sociological 
understanding of human development evolves, so too do our national standards of decency 
as a maturing society. For instance, we no longer execute children before their 
understanding of their own humanity can develop, and reserve the ultimate punishment of 
death for those over the age of eighteen, the age which frequently marks the division 
8 
between childhood and adulthood. See Roper. 543 U.S. at 572-74. 
In Utah, our juvenile courts exist because we recognize that children are in their 
formative years, and if given appropriate education, rehabilitation and treatment within their 
families, can grow to be productive members of society. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, f^ 
16, 63 P.3d 667. We keep children in the juvenile court where their best interests are the 
primary focus, to redirect their behavior toward obedience to the law, and to protect them 
from the adverse consequences of more severe sentences and permanent records attendant 
to adult courts. See id. See also. Houskeeper v. State. 2008 UT 78, fflf 27 and 50 and n.21, 
197 P.3d 636. Juveniles are subject to confinement only until they reach the age of 21 in the 
juvenile system, whereas they may be imprisoned for life in the adult system, see, e.g.. In re 
N.H.B.. 769 P.2d 844, 847-49 (Utah App. 1989). Juvenile courts are generally closed to the 
public, to serve the compelling government interest in shielding juveniles from publicity that 
might otherwise hinder their full rehabilitation. See, e^g,, In re N.H.B.. 769 P.2d 844, 847-49 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Our juvenile courts are very much focused on strengthening the family unit. Parents 
are expected to attend and participate in their children's court hearings and are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts' authority to require parents to participate in the children's 
rehabilitative treatment when the children are placed in secure youth facilities. See, e.g.. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-103(l)(k) and 78A-6-111. By statute, our juvenile courts are designed 
to keep children with their parents in the course of their rehabilitation. Utah Code Ann. 
§78A-6-102(5). If it is necessary to house children in secure facilities, we require those 
9 
facilities to comply with Juvenile Justice Services standards, which are carefully designed in 
an effort to insure that the holding conditions are humane, safe, and foster continuing 
education and positive child development. See, e.g.. Utah Code Ann. §62A-7-104. In sum, 
our juvenile courts are designed to serve numerous compelling governmental and societal 
interests.5 
II. THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE A CHILD IN ADULT 
COURT IS A DRASTIC AND IMPORTANT ONE THAT 
REQUIRES FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW, AND THAT CANNOT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY BE LEFT TO THE UNBRIDLED 
DISCRETION OF A PROSECUTOR. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-102(5) codifies these important purposes of our juvenile 
courts: 
(a) promote public safety and individual accountability by the imposition of 
appropriate sanctions on persons who have committed acts in violation of law; 
(b) order appropriate measures to promote guidance and control, preferably in 
the minor's own home, as an aid in the prevention of future unlawful conduct 
and the development of responsible citizenship; 
(c) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment for 
persons who have committed acts bringing them within the court's jurisdiction; 
(d) adjudicate matters that relate to minors who are beyond parental or adult 
control and to establish appropriate authority over these minors by means of 
placement and control orders; 
(e) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected, and dependent children 
and to provide care and protection for minors by placement, protection, and 
custody orders; 
(f) remove a minor from parental custody only where the minor's safety or 
welfare, or the public safety, may not otherwise be adequately safeguarded; and 
(g) consistent with the ends of justice, act in the best interests of the minor in 
all cases and preserve and strengthen family ties. 
10 
Under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, the fundamental elements of due process to be afforded in any 
case wherein life or liberty is at stake are: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, body, or agency authorized by law to 
determine the questions; (b) an inquiry into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the person of the inauguration and 
purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such person should appear if he 
wishes to be heard; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel; (e) fair 
opportunity to submit evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses; (f) 
judgment to be rendered upon the record thus made. 
Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). 
There is Utah case law intimating that the choice of the adult or juvenile court forum 
involves no liberty interest. See, e.g., State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah App. 1992). 
In State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), the Court tacitly rejected this contention, id. at 
995-96, and properly so. The choice to charge a juvenile in adult court certainly involves 
liberty interests, given that children are subject to confinement only until they reach the age 
of 21 in the juvenile system, whereas they may be imprisoned for life in the adult system, see, 
e.g.. In re N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 847-49 (Utah App. 1989). Moreover, given that children 
prosecuted in adult court are often housed in adult facilities, life may also be at stake. See, 
e.g., Katz Levi, "State v. Mohi: State Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family 
Studies 173, 174-76 and accompanying notes (2007) (explaining how incarcerating children in 
adult jails endangers children, and increases the risk of suicide), in the record at R. 201-234. 
An incomplete reading of old Utah cases might give the impression that the juvenile 
courts exist by virtue of legislative grace, and that children may be prosecuted in adult court 
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anytime, without a hearing to determine the propriety of the forum. See, eg. Burnham v. 
Hayward. 663 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1983), citing State in re Atcheson. 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1978). 
Carefully considered opinions recognize the critical importance of the decision as to 
whether a child will be prosecuted in adult court, and the concomitant need to afford the 
child and our society appropriate procedural protections in the decision making process. 
E.g.. State in re Clatterbuck. 700 P.2d 1076,1078 (Utah 1985); State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991, 
995-996 (Utah 1995), and In re N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App. 1989), citing Kentv. 
United States. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966). Such a decision must be premised on a thorough 
investigation, comply with statutory directives, and be sufficiently detailed to insure thorough 
appellate review. See Clatterbuck and Kent supra.6 
6The Kent Court appended a list of factors created by judges, the U.S. Attorney, and 
various concerned groups, as an example of the proper scope of the inquiry. The factors 
include: 
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the 
protection of the community requires waiver. 
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner. 
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury 
resulted. 
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon 
which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be 
determined by consultation with the United States Attorney). 
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 
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Counsel for Angilau ask the Court to reconsider and overrule the precedents such as 
D.M.Z.. Burnham and Atcheson. supra, because the choice to charge a juvenile in adult court 
certainly involves liberty interests, given that children are subject to confinement only until 
they reach the age of 21 in the juvenile system, whereas they may be imprisoned for life in 
the adult system, see, e ^ , In re N.H.B.. 769 P.2d 844, 847-49 (Utah App. 1989). Counsel 
ask the Court to reconsider and overrule the authorities intimating that no process is due in 
this context, because, given that children prosecuted in adult court are often housed in adult 
facilities, life may also be at stake. See, e^g., Katz Levi, "State v. Mohi: State Sanctioned 
Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 174-76 and accompanying notes (2007) 
(explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails endangers children, and increases the risk 
of suicide). 
As this case demonstrates, one politically elected prosecutor should not have the 
unchecked power to send a child into the adult system, particularly because the statutory 
scheme guarantees no judicial review to correct erroneous decisions. Under the terms of the 
direct file statute, the only way a child whose case is direct-filed in adult court can get back to 
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and 
pattern of living. 
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts 
with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts 
and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior 
commitments to juvenile institutions. 
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of 
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the 
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently 
available to the Juvenile Court. 
Kent 383 U.S. 541, 566-67. 
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juvenile court is if the offenses charged are dismissed or result in a verdict of acquittal. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(3)(b). The statute directs that a child stays in adult court even 
if the preliminary hearing magistrate determines that the prosecutor overcharged the case and 
reduces the charges prior to binding the case over. See id. 
The liberty and life interests which realistically are at stake require judicial scrutiny of 
laws and constitutional protection of children in this legal context. As the Court recognized 
in Mohi 
"[T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such 
tremendous consequences [prosecuting children in the adult system] without 
ceremony-without a hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a 
statement of reason. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with 
adults would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's 
special concern for children ... permitted this procedure. " 
State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991, 996 n.2., quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
III. THE DIRECT FILE STATUTE FAILS TO PROVIDE DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW AND LEAVES THE DECISION OF 
WHETHER CHILDREN WILL BE PROSECUTED IN 
ADULT COURT OR ADJUDICATED IN JUVENILE 
COURT TO THE UNBRIDLED DISCRETION OF THE 
PROSECUTOR. 
The direct file statute, §78A-6-701, which purports to grant the adult court 
jurisdiction over sixteen-year-old Angilau, is in the Juvenile Court Act, under Part 7 entitled, 
"transfers of jurisdiction." It states in full, 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all 
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
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(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated 
murder if committed by an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by 
an adult if the minor has been previously committed to a secure 
facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This Subsection (l)(b) 
shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a 
minor under this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the 
minor regarding all offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any other 
offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal episode. The 
district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the minor 
is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the 
offense over which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or 
(2) shall be tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or justice 
court having jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results 
in an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the 
charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 
78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Sendees regain 
jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
minor. 
Under 78A-6-701, prosecutors may direct file charges in adult court against those 16 
and 17 year old children who are charged with murder or aggravated murder, or who commit 
a felony after having been committed to a secure facility, but only if those children are 
prosecuted by indictment or information. See id. Neither this statute nor any other requires 
a prosecutor to charge these children by indictment or information. Rather, prosecutors 
have full discretion to proceed in juvenile court by filing a petition under Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-6-103(l)(a), which provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
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(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal 
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law 
or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the 
violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.7] 
In contrast to the direct filing statute, the Serious Youth Offender statute requires 
prosecutors to file informations which result in adult prosecution unless the juvenile court 
retains the case after the preliminary hearing.8 The direct file statute does not require the 
filing of an indictment or information at all, but provides district court jurisdiction in cases 
wherein the prosecutor opts to file those pleadings, rather than proceed by petition. 
See 78A-6-701(l), supra. These statutes are properly interpreted according to the plain 
language enacted by the legislature. Versluis v. Guaranty Nat Companies 842 P.2d 865, 
867 (Utah 1992)(when interpreting a statute the Court can "presume that the Legislature used 
each term advisedly, and ... give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning."). 
By choosing to file an information or an indictment under 78A-6-701, prosecutors 
not only select the charges, they select the forum. See id. There is no provision in the direct 
file statute or any other that requires any investigation, inquiry, hearing, statement of 
7Section 78A-7-106 governs those misdemeanors and infractions which are subject to 
prosecution in justice courts. 
8Section 78A-6-702 provides in that regard, 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney 
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by 
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges 
any of the following offenses: ... 
(Emphasis added). 
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rationale, judicial decision or appellate review of any direct file decision, to properly 
adjudicate the propriety of prosecuting Angilau or any other child charged under this statute 
in adult court. But see, e.g.. Kent Clatterbuck Mohi and Christiansen, supra, 
A discretionary decision by one politically elected prosecutor is no substitute for the 
proper Kent inquiry and judicial determination and appellate review of the critical question 
as to whether a child should be prosecuted as an adult or in juvenile court. See, e.g., id.9 
Because there are no legislative guidelines limiting the prosecutors' exercise of unbridled 
discretion to direct file these cases, the current direct filing scheme is unconstitutional under 
Mohi, supra. See id. 
By reviewing the floor debates on Senate Bill 111 in the 1995 General Session of the 
51bt Legislature,10 the Court may confirm that the senate apparently adopted the subsection 
of the statute automatically transferring cases of 16 and 17 year olds charged by information 
9While it is not known if these factors are at play in the instant case, it is an 
unfortunate demonstrated statistical fact that racial and financial discrimination play a role in 
how juveniles are treated in our judicial system. The Utah Commission on Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice studies "Minority Overrepresentation in the Juvenile Justice System," "Race 
in Juvenile Sentencing in Utah," and "Bootstrapping: Is It More Likely to Occur with Youth 
Who Are of Color and/or from Low-Income Families?" provide empirical evidence of the 
unfair treatment of children who are not Caucasian (particularly those descending from 
Pacific Islands) and children from low income families in our system, which begins at the 
point of arrest. The studies are in the record at R. 238-405, and are also available on the 
Commission's webpage, or may be found at 
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/minorityjuvenile.pdf; 
http://www.iustice.utah.gov/Research/Race/RaceAnalysis.pdf; and 
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/Bootstrapping_2002.pdf. 
10Our courts routinely refer to the floor debates in ascertaining the impetus behind 
legislative actions. See, e ^ , Soriano v. Graul 2008 UT App 188, ^2, 186 P.3d 960. 
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or indictment with murder and aggravated murder in an effort to address the excessive 
prosecutorial discretion at issue in State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), and to expedite 
the arrival at the prison of those dangerous juveniles who would end up there eventually. 
See R. 106 and 108. The house debates, also included in the record, do not reflect a clear 
understanding by our representatives of the constitutional problem with the statute they 
enacted. See R. 113-119. The key discussions and votes on the bill occurred before the 
Mohi opinion was issued, and thus the lawmakers did not benefit from or account for the 
Court's published analysis of the unconstitutionality of the law in effect prior to the 
amendments.11 
While Utah courts have upheld direct filing provisions in the Utah Code prior to 
Mohi, these decisions turn in large part on the fact that the versions of the statutes at issue 
allowed for recall hearings to review the propriety of the adult court forum. See, In re 
N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487, 490-92 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding direct filing statute because, inter 
alia, the recall hearings provided the right to counsel, a record of the proceedings, a hearing, 
and appropriate findings); State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 402-404 (Utah 1989) (in upholding 
direct filing statute, which was contingent on the juvenile court's determination that recall to 
juvenile court was inappropriate, the court recognized, "[OJur decision is supported by the 
crucial fact that under the statute in question, the juvenile court has the right and retains the 
power in the final regard to 'recall control' over the child and bring him or her back into the 
nThe Mohi opinion was filed on June 15,1995. Id. 901 P.2d 991. The floor debates 
occurred in February and March of 1995 (R. 105, 113). 
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juvenile system."). There is no recall provision in the current direct file statute. 
Nor does the current direct file statute contemplate an appeal of right from the child's 
arrival in the adult system, which appeals are provided as a matter of right for children whose 
cases arrive in adult court through certification from the juvenile court or through a Serious 
Youth Offender bindover order from juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-704. In 
Utah, our appellate courts sit as courts of equity, and afford the broadest scope of appellate 
review in appeals from juvenile court. In re L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1982). Under 
the direct file statute, however, there is no judicial or appellate review of the prosecutor's 
decision to place the children in the adult court system. 
In Mohi. the Court accepted an interlocutory appeal raising various claims by three 
juveniles, ultimately held that the direct filing statute at issue there was unconstitutional 
because it provided unbridled prosecutorial discretion to direct file, and remanded the cases 
for certification hearings. See 901 P.2d at 994-95 and 1006-07. In dictum, the Court 
indicated that the legislature could constitutionally opt to remove a group of children from 
the classification of juvenile offenders and could thereby permit the prosecution of those 
children in adult court without providing them a hearing. See id., 901 P.2d at 1005. In 
footnotes 14, 19 and 24, however, the Mohi Court repeatedly drew attention to Tenth Circuit 
authority, Kellev v. Kaiser. 992 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1993), which recognizes that once a state 
creates a juvenile court system, the federal constitution requires a Kent hearing as a 
constitutional requirement of any adult court prosecution. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at 1001 n.14, 
1003 n.19, and 1005 n.24., citing Kaiser, 992 F.2d at 1515 ("Having created the juvenile 
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court system, under Kent, it is the State's decision to seek to treat a juvenile as an adult that, in 
and of itself triggers the need for a hearing/'). 
The time has come for this Court to recognize that all children do have a 
constitutional right to be prosecuted in juvenile court, and that the right may be revoked only 
after due process is afforded. Such a right would properly be premised on the Federal Due 
Process Clause, see Kent, and the Equal Protection Clause, discussed further herein. 
Such a right flows naturally from and should be grounded in several Utah 
Constitutional guarantees. Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, the due process provision, 
has previously been interpreted to require a full panoply of procedural rights in contexts such 
as this one, wherein both life and liberty are at stake. See, e^g., Christiansen v. Harris, supra. 
The lives and liberties of our children are no less valuable than those of adults, and the 
determination of whether their cases are adjudicated in adult or juvenile court has major 
impact on their liberty, and may also jeopardize their lives. See In re N.H.B. and Katz-Levi 
article, supra. 
The uniform operation of laws provision, Article I § 24, is properly brought to bear to 
insure that all similarly situated children are treated equally by the laws, and that the 
legislature does not create unreasonable distinctions in the law, or create laws which classify 
people in a manner that does not reasonably further statutory goals. See, e.g., Merrill v. Utah 
Labor Com'n. 2009 UT 26, ffi[ 6-7, 2009 WL 1098294. All statutory goals of the juvenile 
court are facilitated by adjudicating all children's cases in that court, unless a proper inquiry 
establishes that their cases require adjudication in adult court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
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102(5) (stating purposes of Juvenile Court Act). 
The constitutional provision forbidding the enactment of special or private laws, 
Article VI § 26, would be an excellent source of a constitutional right of all children to be 
treated in the juvenile courts, because that provision forbids the legislature to enact laws that 
create unnatural classifications which separate out people who are not legitimately 
particularized or separated from, the group of which they are a natural or intrinsic part. See, 
e.g.. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Utah Insurance Guarantee Association. 564 
P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1977). Treating children as a natural gtoup, defined by the physiological 
facts of human brain development, and recognizing their right to have their cases adjudicated 
in juvenile court absent a full inquiry indicating that they are not suited to be there, honors 
the letter and spirit of Article VI § 26. 
Article I § 9 of the Utah Constitution is a suitable source for a child's constitutional 
right to have his or her case adjudicated in the juvenile court. The history of this 
constitutional provision reflects that it was designed to protect arrestees from inhumane 
detention. Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at 
Salt Lake City on the Fourth Day of March. 1895. to Adopt a Constitution for the State of 
Utah 257-58 (1898) (object of unnecessary rigor clause protects "persons in jail if they shall 
be treated inhumanely while they are in prison."). Our courts likewise recognize that the 
guarantee against unnecessarily rigorous treatment applies to the treatment of arrestees and 
inmates and protects them against unnecessary abuse. E.g.. Bott v. DeLand. 922 P.2d 732, 
737 (Utah 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box 
21 
Elder County Sch. Dist, 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533. Bott demonstrates in the context of an 
inmate medical malpractice suit that the "unnecessary rigor" inquiry focuses on whether a 
particular practice is necessary, or whether it is needlessly harsh, dehumanizing or degrading. 
Id. at 740. Unnecessary rigor is "treatment which is clearly excessive or deficient and 
unjustified/' as distinguished from the standard irritations and inconveniences of prison life. 
Id. at 741. Examples of unnecessary rigor include unnecessary exposure to "increased risk of 
serious harm," Dexter v. Bosko. 2008 UT 29, f 19, 184 P.3d 592, requiring complete silence 
from inmates, id. at f^ 19, or failure to provide timely medical care after receiving numerous 
requests from an inmate, id., citing Bott supra. 
Classifications which remove children from juvenile court, and risk their placement in 
adult detention facilities, without regard to their actual cases and circumstances, are by nature 
overbroad and unduly harsh, and dehumanize and degrade those individual children who 
need and deserve to be protected by the juvenile court system. Recognizing an Article I 
section 9 right of children to be prosecuted in juvenile court absent a thorough procedural 
inquiry would thus serve the salutary constitutional goals of preventing unnecessary rigor and 
cruelty in the prosecution of children. 
Finally, children's constitutional right to be treated as children by our laws and our 
courts might well be premised on Article I §27 of the Utah Constitution, which recognizes 
that "[f|requent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual 
rights and the perpetuity of free government." This State prides itself on providing for its 
children in a civilized manner, and has a well-developed juvenile court system to protect its 
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children and strengthen their family units. See, e^g., Tanner, and SchofiekL and Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-6-102(5), supra. This State must uniformly protect the rights of children to be 
prosecuted in juvenile court, unless a thorough and proper inquiry and adjudication calls for 
prosecution in the adult system. As the Court observed in MohL 
"[TJhere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such 
tremendous consequences [prosecuting children in the adult system] without 
ceremony-without a hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a 
statement of reason. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with 
adults would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's 
special concern for children ... permitted this procedure. " 
State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991, 996 n.2., quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
IV. THE DIRECT FILE STATUTE VIOLATES ARTICLE I §§ 
24 and 7, AND ARTICLE VI §26 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL EQUAL 
PROTECTION. 
A. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. State Uniform Operation of Laws 
Article I § 24 of the Utah Constitution guarantees uniform operation of laws. In 
striking the juvenile direct filing provision in State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995), 
the Court described the unique application of the state constitutional provision, stating, 
"[Fjor a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that it be uniform on 
its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate 
uniformly if'persons similarly situated* are not 'treated similarly."' Id. at 997 (citations and 
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internal quotation marks omitted, some brackets by the court). 
Courts applying the uniform operation of laws provision are to assess the 
reasonableness of classifications, evaluate the legitimacy of the purpose behind legislative 
actions, and determine if the classifications reasonably serve those legislative purposes. 
See, Mohi. 901 P.2d at 997-999; Merrill v. Utah Labor Com'n. 2009 UT 26, ^ 9 2009 WL 
1098294. 
To adjudge the reasonableness of classifications, the Court considers 
(1) if there is a greater burden on one class as opposed to another without a 
reason; (2) if the statute results in unfair discrimination; (3) if the statute 
creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable; or (4) if the statute 
singles out similarly situated people or groups without justification. 
Merrill, f 10. 
The portion of the direct file statute under which Angilau is charged creates two 
classifications, one aspect premised on the offender's age and one premised on the offense 
charged. 
While age-based classifications are normally reviewed for a rational basis, see, Merrill 
v. Utah Labor Com'n. 2009 UT 26 1J12, 2009 WL 1098294, the statute at issue should be 
reviewed with strict scrutiny because it impinges upon the liberty and lives of our children — 
fundamental rights. Their education is likewise jeopardized by prosecution in the adult 
system, and is another important right to consider in selecting strict, or at least intermediate 
scrutiny. See Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (applying what appears to be 
intermediate scrutiny to law impacting right to education). 
While children are likely not a traditional suspect class, our Courts do afford them 
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special constitutional protections tailored to their vulnerability and special needs. See, e.g.. 
Roper, supra; In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 41, 55 (1967) (recognizing juvenile rights against self-
incrimination and to counsel); Breed v. Jones. 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (recognizing juvenile 
right against double jeopardy); Belotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (discussing minors' 
right of access to abortion). The fact that they have no political power because they cannot 
vote and have no meaningful access to the legislative process, further calls upon the Court to 
protect their interests. See United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 153 
n.4 (1938) (recognizing the duty of the Courts to protect those small and insular minorities 
who have no meaningful access to participation in the legislative/political process). 
The age-based classification results in unjustifiable and severely disparate treatment of 
similarly situated children. Given the biological facts of brain development, and depending 
on his or her circumstances, a child who is sixteen years of age might well be far less mature, 
less blameworthy and not appropriately prosecuted in adult court and held in adult facilities, 
in comparison to adults who are in the adult system with him, or to younger children who 
are statutorily entitled to juvenile court adjudication. See Roper briefs (R. 120-200). The 
absence of a certification hearing or a recall hearing or anything approaching a Kent hearing 
necessarily results in a statute which is overbroad in its application, sweeping within its ambit 
children who do not require adult prosecution to satisfy the statutory purposes. Cf. In re 
N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487, 490-92 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding direct filing statute because, inter 
alia, the recall hearings provided the right to counsel, a record of the proceedings, a hearing, 
and appropriate findings); State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 402-404 (Utah 1989) (in upholding 
direct filing statute, which was contingent on the juvenile court's determination that recall to 
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juvenile court was inappropriate, the court recognized, "[0]ur decision is supported by the 
crucial fact that under the statute in question, the juvenile court has the right and retains the 
power in the final regard to 'recall control' over the child and bring him or her back into the 
juvenile system."). 
The offense-based classification is likewise constitutionally problematic because it 
grants prosecutors super discretion not only to select charges, but also to select the forum. 
On a given set of facts, a prosecutor might elect to send a child to adult court by charging 
aggravated murder or murder, or might elect to charge manslaughter, homicide by assault, 
negligent homicide or any number of lesser offenses, or none at all, if the facts demonstrated 
that the child was acting in self defense or was otherwise legally justified. It must be borne in 
mind that the statute indicates these cases will remain in adult court unless the qualifying 
charge is dismissed or results in acquittal. If the conviction enters by plea or verdict to a 
lesser offense, the child remains in the adult system. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701. Thus, 
under the statute, a prosecutor with evidence which amounts to an offense less than murder 
might be politically, personally or mistakenly motivated to file the murder charge to bring the 
child into the adult courts, where the prosecutor's bargaining power is magnified 
exponentially, because the risks and the harms to the children are immediate and significant. 
In the absence of any statutory guidelines or limitation, the prosecutor's unfettered discretion 
to charge a case as murder or aggravated murder and to charge it in adult or juvenile court 
may in fact turn on any number of personal and even unconstitutional predilections.12 The 
12While it is not known if these factors are at play in the instant case, it is an 
unfortunate demonstrated statistical fact that racial and financial discrimination play a role in 
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prosecutor's unchecked discretion supplants what should be a carefully investigated judicial 
inquiry which is subject to powerful appellate review. But see, e.g., Clatterbuck and Kent, 
supra. 
The constitutional presumption of innocence should also enter into the Court's 
assessment of the statutory offense classification, because the statutory classification requires 
an unconstitutional assumption to have any validity. Unless the Court assumes 
unconstitutionally that the children are guilty of the offenses with which they stand charged, 
there is no need to protect society from them or expedite their arrival in prison or prosecute 
them in the adult system. But see, e ^ , State v. King. 2008 UT 54, ^ 21, 190 P.3d 1283 
(explaining the function of the constitutional presumption of innocence: to protect individual 
autonomy from the "government's monopoly on coercive power"). 
In Mohi the Court ultimately struck the direct filing statute in effect at that time, 
because it created two classes of juveniles - those who were subject to juvenile court and 
those who were selected by prosecutors for adult court prosecutions - without providing any 
statutory guidance for prosecutors, and thus did not serve the statutorily designated purposes 
how juveniles are treated in our judicial system. The Utah Commission on Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice studies "Minority Overrepresentation in the Juvenile Justice System," "Race 
in Juvenile Sentencing in Utah," and "Bootstrapping: Is It More Likely to Occur with Youth 
Who Are of Color and/or from Low-Income Families?" provide empirical evidence of the 
unfair treatment of children who are not Caucasian (particularly those descending from 
Pacific Islands) and children from low income families in our system, which begins at the 
point of arrest. The studies are in the record at R. 238-405, and are also available on the 
Commission's webpage, or may be found at 
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/minorityjuvenile.pdf; 
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/RaceAnalysis.pdf; and 
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Research/Race/Bootstrapping_2002.pdf. 
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of the juvenile court act in a reasonable way. Id.13 
The current direct file statute should be stricken under Mohi, because it provides no 
recall hearing or direct appeal from the filing of the case in adult court, and thus provides 
greater prosecutorial discretion than the Mohi statute, without serving the interests of the 
Juvenile Court Act of which it is a part.14 Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-102(5) recognizes that 
the juvenile courts' purposes are to: 
(a) promote public safety and individual accountability by the imposition of 
appropriate sanctions on persons who have committed acts in violation of law; 
(b) order appropriate measures to promote guidance and control, preferably in 
the minor's own home, as an aid in the prevention of future unlawful conduct 
and the development of responsible citizenship; 
(c) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment for 
persons who have committed acts bringing them within the court's jurisdiction; 
(d) adjudicate matters that relate to minors who are beyond parental or adult 
control and to establish appropriate authority over these minors by means of 
placement and control orders; 
Subsection 6 of the 1993 version of § 78-3a-25 was at issue in Mohi. It provided: 
(6) (a) When a petition in the case of a juvenile 16 years of age or older alleges 
any class of criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, or any other 
offense that would be a capital offense or a first degree felony if committed by 
an adult, the juvenile is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court except 
under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) If an indictment on the charge is returned by a grand jury or a criminal 
information is filed by a county attorney or district attorney, the juvenile court 
is divested of jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-16. The charge shall be made 
and the proceedings regarding the charge shall be conducted in every respect 
as if the juvenile were an adult A copy of the information or indictment shall 
be filed forthwith in the juvenile court as notice to that court. 
The full statute is copied in Addendum C to this brief. 
14Counsel for Angilau concede the legitimacy of these statutory purposes. 
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(e) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected, and dependent children 
and to provide care and protection for minors by placement, protection, and 
custody orders; 
(f) remove a minor from parental custody only where the minor's safety or 
welfare, or the public safety, may not otherwise be adequately safeguarded; and 
(g) consistent with the ends of justice, act in the best interests of the minor in 
all cases and preserve and strengthen family ties. 
The statutory classifications are categorical and thus do not "promote public safety 
and individual accountability by the imposition of appropriate sanctions on persons who 
have committed acts in violation of law." But see 78A-6-102(5)(a). Particularly because the 
classifications expedite the arrival of children in adult jails and prisons, they do not "order 
appropriate measures to promote guidance and control, preferably in the minor's own home, 
as an aid in the prevention of future unlawful conduct and the development of responsible 
citizenship." But see id, subsection (b). Nor do they "where appropriate, order 
rehabilitation, reeducation and treatment" of people whose acts bring them within the 
juvenile court's jurisdiction," as subsection (c) contemplates. The statutory classifications of 
the direct file statute result in the placement of children in adult facilities regardless of 
whether they are "beyond parental or adult control." But see id, subsection (d). They do not 
require adjudication of whether children have been abused, neglected or are dependent, and 
are not designed to promote care and protection of the children. But see id. subsection (e). 
They result in children's being removed from parents' custody, without regard to whether 
their safety or welfare, or the public safety so require. But see id., subsection (f). Nor are the 
statutory classifications "consistent with the ends of justice," or designed to serve "the best 
interests of the minor in all cases" or "preserve and strengthen family ties." But see id., 
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subsection (g). 
The direct file statute does not serve the interests discussed in the floor debates. 
Senator Hillyard told the senate that the amendments would insure that all 16 and 17 year 
olds charged with murder would be automatically prosecuted in adult court (R. 106) and that 
the amendments would protect society by expediting the arrival in prison of those children 
who would end up there eventually (R. 108). Representative Fox told the House members 
that the amendments would give district court exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles age 16 and 
older charged with murder and aggravated murder (R. 115). Contrary to the legislative 
intentions articulated in the floor debates, the statutory classifications give prosecutors 
greater discretion over these children than they enjoyed under the statutory scheme stricken 
in Mohj because their charging decision not only selects the offense, but by charging in an 
adult court information or juvenile court petition also selects the forum, and is not subject to 
a recall hearing or appeal. 
To the extent that the rise in serious juvenile crimes requires treatment of juvenile 
offenders in the adult system in order to protect the public or deter juvenile crime, section 
78A-6-701 does nothing to further those interests, because they are already served by the 
certification statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-603(3) provides: 
(3) Except as provided in Section 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth 
Offender statute], in the case of a minor 14 years of age or older, the county 
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general may commence an action by 
filing a criminal information and a motion requesting the juvenile court to 
waive its jurisdiction and certify the minor to the district court. 
The certification statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-703, permits prosecutors to seek adult 
prosecution of all juveniles fourteen years of age and older when they are charged with 
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felonious conduct and are otherwise appropriately prosecuted in adult court. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-6-703.15 This statute 
15That statute provides: 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges 
the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the 
juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its 
case and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed 
it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of 
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or of 
the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, and 
may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires 
isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with two or more 
persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under 
Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or 
willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given 
to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment, 
emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the juvenile 
court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 
minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the 
district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
0 whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as 
provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is 
discretionary with the court. 
(5)(a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical, 
educational, and social history may be considered by the court, 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, the 
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requires full consideration of the Kent factors by the juvenile court, see id., and section 78A-
6-704(1) provides for immediate appellate review of any certification order. Any child 
subject to prosecution under the direct file statute could be prosecuted in adult court under 
court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear 
and be subject to both direct and cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call witnesses, 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by Subsection 
(3)-
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may enter 
an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the 
juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-115, Section 78A-6-1111, and other provisions relating 
to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to the 
extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court 
is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same right to 
bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a 
criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a 
committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section 78A-6-702, 
the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 
same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, 
except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any other 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over 
the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
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the certification statute if the proper judicial inquiry determined that the individual facts and 
circumstances of his or her case and situation merited adult court prosecution. 
In sum, the direct file statute creates classes of children who are treated in vastly more 
punitive and destructive ways than similarly situated children are, without justification. The 
statutory classifications and means do not reasonably relate to or serve legitimate 
governmental interests, but rather, put our children and society at significant risk of 
constitutional abuses by the government. 
The discussion of federal equal protection analysis, infra, is equally applicable in this 
context, albeit the Court has authority to grant greater protection under state constitutional 
law if necessary. Rg,, Merrill v. Utah Labor Com'n. 2009 UT 26 % 7, 2009 WL 1098294. To 
insure that children in Utah are fully protected regardless of what a federal court might do, 
the Court should strike the direct file statute under both the Uniform Operation of Laws 
provision, and may also strike it under the federal law set forth in Point IV subpoint B of this 
brief, infra. 
2. State Prohibition of Special Laws 
The constitutional provision forbidding the enactment of special or private laws, 
Article VI § 26, forbids the legislature to enact laws that create unnatural classifications, 
which classifications separate out people who are not legitimately particularized or separated 
from the group of which they are a natural or intrinsic part. See, e ^ , Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Company v. Utah Insurance Guarantee Association, 564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 
1977). Sixteen and seventeen year old children are properly included in, and not separated 
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out of, the natural classification of children for purposes of prosecution and punishment, 
because their brains are not fully developed, and as a consequence, they lack the adult ability 
to consider the consequences of their actions and to control their impulses. See discussion 
of Roper and amicus briefs supra, R. 120-200. Particularly in the context of criminal law, these 
children are a natural part of the class of other redeemable children who are vulnerable and 
deserve our protection and forgiveness. See id. Conversely, there is nothing about the class 
of sixteen and seventeen year old children charged with murder and aggravated murder that 
makes them a natural and intrinsic class. The statute which groups them separately from 
other children is not a permissible general law, but is instead a special or private law, which is 
expressly forbidden by the Utah Constitution. See Utah Farm Bureau, supra. Accordingly, 
the Court should strike § 78A-6-701 under Article VI § 26, and order the information 
dismissed from adult court for want of jurisdiction. 
3. State Due Process 
Our state constitutional Due Process provision, Article I § 7, forbids laws which are 
arbitrary and capricious in operation, or which do not rationally relate to the statutory goal. 
See, e.g.. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1271-72 (Utah 1988) (striking portions of a 
criminal sentencing statute because they were imported from an inapposite portion of the 
code and did not sensibly apply toward the ultimate purpose of the statute). As detailed 
above, the classifications of children by age and offense are arbitrary and capricious because 
many children who are charged with the qualifying offenses and are within the qualifying age 
group are not appropriately prosecuted or sentenced in adult court. Moreover, those 
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classifications do not logically or reasonably serve the articulated purposes of the Juvenile 
Court Act of which the statute is a part. Rather, the classifications will result in the 
prosecution of some children as adults, despite the fact that those children do not belong in 
the adult system. Contrary to the legislative intentions articulated in the floor debates, the 
statutory classifications give prosecutors greater discretion over these children than they 
enjoyed under the statutory scheme stricken in Mohi because their charging decision not 
only selects the offense, but also selects the forum, and is not subject to a recall hearing or 
appeal. Their charging decision effectively supplants the Kent hearing, but is not anywhere 
near a constitutionally satisfactory substitute. Cf. id. Accordingly, the Court should also rely 
on Article I § 7 in striking § 78A-6-701. 
B. FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to equal protection of 
the law. Because the adult court's jurisdictional statute classifies juveniles in arbitrary ways, 
the jurisdictional statute violates principles of equal protection. See, e^g., Wood v. University 
of Utah Medical Center. 67 P.3d 436, 449 2002 UT 134, ffl[ 33-34 (Utah 2002)(recognizing 
that state constitution requires all laws apply uniformly to similarly situated people, and that 
the federal constitution requires laws to apply in similar fashion to similarly situated 
individuals). 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, analysis begins with the selection of the level of 
judicial scrutiny to apply to a law. The most lenient form of scrutiny is the rational basis test, 
wherein the party challenging a law must demonstrate that a statute's classifications are 
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wholly irrational. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana. 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981). Intermediate 
scrutiny is applied to laws which impact important albeit not constitutional rights, or which 
burden a quasi-suspect class. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). This 
intermediate level of scrutiny requires the party defending the law to establish that it 
substantially relates to an important governmental interest. See, e^g., Wengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Insurance Company, 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980). The most probing form of scrutiny, 
strict scrutiny, applies to legislation which impinges on a fundamental right or burdens a 
suspect class. See, e.g.. Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202. 216-17 (1982V This test requires the 
party defending the law to show that it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest. See, e.g.. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
As noted above, while age-based classifications are normally reviewed for a rational 
basis, see, Merrill v. Utah Labor Com?n. 2009 UT 26 % 12, 2009 WL 1098294, the statute at 
issue should be reviewed with strict scrutiny because it impinges upon the liberty and lives of 
our children - fundamental rights. Their education is likewise jeopardized by prosecution in 
the adult system, and is another important right to consider in selecting strict, or at least 
intermediate scrutiny. See Plyler. supra (applying what appears to be intermediate scrutiny to 
law impacting right to education). 
While children are likely not a traditional suspect class, our Courts do afford them 
special constitutional protections tailored to their vulnerability and special needs. See, e.g.. 
Roper, supra, In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1, 41, 55 (1967) (recognizing juvenile rights against self-
incrimination and to counsel); Breed v. Tones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (recognizing juvenile 
right against double jeopardy); Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) (discussing minors' 
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right of access to abortion). The fact that they have no political power because they cannot 
vote and have no meaningful access to the legislative process, further calls upon the Court to 
protect their interests. See United States v. Carolene Products Company. 304 U.S. 144,153 
n.4 (1938) (recognizing the duty of the Courts to protect those small and insular minorities 
who have no meaningful access to participation in the legislative/political process). 
As discussed above, the statutory classifications do not serve any rational 
governmental objective, and are not narrowly or rationally tailored to serve any such interest. 
As detailed above, the classifications do not serve the codified purposes of the Juvenile 
Court Act. Contrary to the legislative intentions articulated in the floor debates, the statutory 
classifications give prosecutors greater discretion over these children than they enjoyed under 
the statutory scheme stricken in Mohi because their charging decision not only selects the 
offense, but also selects the forum, and is not subject to a judicial recall or other hearing or 
appeal. Particularly because any case falling under the direct file statute could be handled 
properly through the certification process, the direct file statute serves no rational purpose. 
Rather, it creates classes of children who are treated in vastly more punitive and destructive 
ways than others are, without justification or rationale, and facilitates discriminatory action by 
state actors. 
Accordingly, the Court should strike the statute under the Federal Equal Protection 
Clause. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL ANALYSIS IN UPHOLDING THE 
DIRECT FILE STATUTE WAS INCORRECT. 
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A. The Direct File Statute Grants Prosecutors Greater Discretion 
than did the Direct File Statute Stricken as Unconstitutional in 
Mohi. 
The trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss erroneously holds that the 
statute stricken as unconstitutional in Mohi was amended to remove the language granting 
prosecutors unfettered discretion to file such cases in adult court (R. 443). As detailed 
above, the statute stricken in Mohi. in Addendum C, has been amended significandy, but not 
in any way that obviates or diminishes the unconstitutional discretion prosecutors have to file 
cases in adult or juvenile court. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6)(b) (1993) 
(Addendum C) with Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701 (Addendum B). Rather, the statutory 
amendments have effectively augmented the prosecutorial discretion to file juvenile cases 
directly in adult court, by insulating direct filing decisions from judicial review. The recall 
hearings which were available under the Mohi statutory scheme are no longer afforded to 
direct file juveniles. By obviating the recall hearings, the amendments also obviate appellate 
review, resulting in even greater prosecutorial discretion to file in adult court than existed 
under the Mohi statute. 
The trial court ruled that a prosecutor's discretion under the direct file statute is the 
traditional discretion afforded to all prosecutors in all criminal cases, to review the evidence 
and select which charges to file (R. 443-44). This reasoning fails to recognize that 
prosecutors are not required to file informations or indictments over which district courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction under 78A-6-701, but have full authority to prosecute the 
juveniles by way of petition in juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(l)(a), 
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which provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive 
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal 
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law 
or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the 
violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.16] 
Under the current direct file scheme, prosecutors not only have discretion to select the 
charge, but also, have discretion to choose between the drastically different juvenile and adult 
court fora and attendant consequences.17 Because the prosecutorial discretion provided by 
Section 78A-7-106 governs those misdemeanors and infractions which are subject 
to prosecution in justice courts. 
17Juvenile and adult courts are dramatically different in approach. In juvenile court 
the best interests of the juveniles are the prime focus, and the goals are to redirect the 
juveniles' behavior toward obedience to the law, and to protect them from the adverse 
consequences of more severe sentences and permanent records attendant to adult courts. 
See State v. Schofield 2002 UT 132, ^ 16, 63 P.3d 667; Houskeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, fflj 
27 and 50 and n.21, 197 P.3d 636. Juvenile courts are generally closed to the public, to serve 
the compelling government interest in shielding juveniles from publicity that might otherwise 
hinder their full rehabilitation. See, e ^ , In re v. N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844, 847-49 (Utah App. 
1989). Juvenile courts try to redirect juveniles while they are at home with their parents and 
families. Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-102(5). If it is necessary to house them in secure facilities, 
we require those facilities to comply with Juvenile Justice Services standards, which are 
carefully designed in an effort to insure that the holding conditions are humane, safe, and 
foster continuing education and positive child development. See, e ^ , Utah Code Ann. 
§62A-7-104. Juvenile courts aim to unify and strengthen families, and parents of juveniles 
are generally required to participate in the rehabilitation of the juveniles. Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78A-6-103(l)(k), 78A-6-111 and 78A-6-102(5). 
Juvenile and adult courts are dramatically different in potential consequences. 
Juveniles are subject to confinement only until they reach the age of 21 in the juvenile 
system, whereas they may be imprisoned for life in the adult system, see, e.g.. In re N.H.B., 
769 P.2d 844, 847-49 (Utah App. 1989). Moreover, given that children prosecuted in adult 
court are often housed in adult facilities, life may also be at stake. See, e.g.. Katz Levi, "State 
v. Mohi: State Sanctioned Abuse," 10 Journal of Law and Family Studies 173, 174-76 and 
accompanying notes (2007) (explaining how incarcerating children in adult jails endangers 
children, and increases the risk of suicide). 
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the current direct file statute exceeds that permitted by the unconstitutional statute stricken 
in Mohi, this Court should order the current statute stricken. See id. 
B. The Constitutions Must Apply to the Decision as 
to Whether a Juvenile is Prosecuted in Adult 
Court or in Juvenile Court. 
The district court summarily rejected several constitutional challenges to the direct file 
statute, including those premised on the Due Process, Unnecessary Rigor, Uniform 
Operation of Laws, and Special Laws Prohibition sections in the Utah Constitution, and on 
the Due Process and Equal Protection provisions in the Federal Constitution. The court did 
not address any of these provisions individually or on the merits, but found that the 
constitutional arguments were "necessarily unavailing" because juveniles have no 
constitutional right to be treated as juveniles (R. 444) (relying on State v. Mohi., 901 P.2d at 
1005, and State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 399 (Utah 1989)). 
Our State and Federal Constitutions are the supreme law of the land, and there is no 
area of legislation which is immune from constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., American Bush v. 
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ^ 23, 140 P.3d 1235 (dting, e ^ , Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77, 2 L.Ed 60 (1803)). 
While there are cases which support the trial court's reasoning and intimate that there 
are no life or liberty interests at stake in the choice of adult or juvenile forums, and that 
children may be prosecuted in adult court anytime,18 these cases diverge from the reality that 
18E.g., State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah App. 1992). Burnham v. Hayward, 
663 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1983); State in re Atcheson, 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). 
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liberty and life interests are at issue in this legal context, see, e.g.. In re N.H.B.. 769 P.2d 844, 
847-49 (Utah App. 1989), Katz-Levi article, supra. They do not square with State v. Mohi. 
901 P.2d 991, 995-86 (Utah 1995), which demonstrates that statutes governing whether 
juveniles are prosecuted in adult or juvenile court are subject to constitutional scrutiny. Nor 
do they square with Kelley v. Kaiser. 992 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1993), which recognizes that 
once a state creates a juvenile court system, the federal constitution requires a Kent hearing 
as a constitutional requirement of any adult court prosecution. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at 1001 
n.14, 1003 n.19, and 1005 n.24., citing Kaiser. 992 F.2d at 1515. Accordingly, this Court 
should overrule precedents such as Burnham. Atcheson and D.M.Z.. because the choice to 
charge a juvenile in adult court, and the liberty and life interests which realistically are at 
stake, require both judicial scrutiny and constitutional protection. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at 996 
n.2, quoting Kent. 383 U.S. at 554. See also Points II and III of this brief, supra. 
C. The Trial Court's Effort to Reconcile 
Statutory Conflicts Was Incorrect and 
Exceeded Proper Judicial Bounds. 
Because Angilau is a minor, and is not charged under the Serious Youth Offender 
statute, 78A-6-702, or the certification statute, 78A-6-703, his case should be adjudicated as a 
civil matter in a juvenile court exercising equitable powers. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116.19 
19That statute provides, 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, proceedings in a 
minor's case shall be regarded as a civil proceeding with the court exercising 
equitable powers. 
(2) An adjudication by a juvenile court that a minor is within its jurisdiction 
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The majority of the trial court's decision reflects its effort to square the direct filing 
statute, which grants adult courts exclusive jurisdiction over sixteen and seventeen year olds 
charged by information or indictment with murder, with the statute which forbids minors to 
be charged with crimes unless they are charged under the certification statute, under the 
Serious Youth offender statute, or with traffic violations (R. 439-42). 
The latter statute, Section 78A-6-116, provides in relevant part: 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth Offender 
Statute] and 78A-6-703 [the certification statute], proceedings in a minor's case 
shall be regarded as a civil proceeding with the court exercising equitable 
powers. 
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except 
as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth Offender statute] and 
78A-6-703 [the certification statute], and in cases involving traffic violations. 
When a petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the minor may not later 
be subjected to criminal prosecution based on the same facts except as 
provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703. 
The trial court first concluded that the legislature made a conscious choice to exclude 
under Section 78A-6-103 is not considered a conviction of a crime, except in 
cases involving traffic violations. An adjudication may not operate to impose 
any civil disabilities upon the minor nor to disqualify the minor for any civil 
service or military service or appointment. 
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except 
as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, and in cases involving 
traffic violations. When a petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the 
minor may not later be subjected to criminal prosecution based on the same 
facts except as provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703. 
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the direct file statute, 78A-6-701, from the list of exceptions to juvenile court jurisdiction in 
78A-6-116(3), supra (R. 441-42). This conclusion was premised on a review of various 
statutory revisions, wherein the direct file provision in effect at the time of Mohi was 
renumbered and amended out of the statute describing the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, 
to a "stand alone55 provision. The court reasoned that because the legislature renumbered 
various provisions of the juvenile code, and set forth the direct file statute in an independent 
"stand alone55 format, the legislature did not view the direct file statute and 78A-6-113(3) as 
conflicting (R. 441-42). 
There appears to be no rule of statutory construction which supports the trial court's 
reasoning that the renumbering or reformatting of a statute, or its excision from a general 
statute and placement in a "stand alone55 statute, leads to valid inferences as to legislative 
intent. Moreover, the trial court's reasoning does not square with the fact that the 
certification statute, which was also part of the same general statute as the direct file statute at 
the time of Mohi. was also renumbered and made a stand-alone statute, but is still expressly 
mentioned as an exception to the cases which must be adjudicated as civil matter in juvenile 
court in 78A-6-116(3), supra. The fact that the legislature specified certification cases, Serious 
Youth Offender cases, and traffic cases as exceptions to juvenile court jurisdiction is properly 
interpreted as an indication that the legislature did not intend to include direcdy filed cases 
among the list of exceptions. C£, Field v. Boyer Co.. L.C.. 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998) 
(recognizing the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius" which 
means the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another); Hansen v. Wilkinson, 
658 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983) ("It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that 
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ordinarily when people say one thing they do not mean something else/') (quoting 2a C. 
Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.01 (4th ed. 1973)). 
The district court attempted to reconcile the conflict in the plain language of the two 
statutes, by viewing 78A-6-116(3) as if it applied only to proceedings in the juvenile court's 
original jurisdiction. Thus, the court literally rewrote subsection of the statute as if it read, 
"[In all cases over which the juvenile court has original jurisdiction, a] minor 
may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except as provided 
in Section 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, and in cases involving traffic 
violations." 
(R. 442, brackets by the trial court). 
The court's interpretation of subsection 3 of the statute is incorrect, because it 
interprets the first sentence of subsection 3 as if traffic offenses fall within the original 
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. See R. 442. Many traffic offenses are actually excluded 
from juvenile court jurisdiction, and instead often lie in the original jurisdiction of the justice 
of the peace courts, or in district courts when there are no justice courts in the municipality 
where the case arises, if the defendants are sixteen years of age or older. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78A-7-106 (2) (recognizing justice court jurisdiction over many traffic and other 
misdemeanors committed by those sixteen years of age and older); 78A-6-103(l)(a) 
(excluding cases falling within 78A-7-106(2) from juvenile court jurisdiction), 78A-5-102(9) 
(recognizing district court jurisdiction over many traffic offenses committed by those sixteen 
or older in jurisdictions without justice courts). 
The court's interpretation of subsection 3 does not account for subsection 1 of the 
same statute, 78A-6-116, which, similarly to the actual subsection 3, recognizes Serious 
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Youth Offender and certification cases the only exceptions to the general rule that minors' 
cases are to be civil proceedings wherein the juvenile courts exercise equitable powers. 
Subsection (1) provides: 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, proceedings in a 
minor's case shall be regarded as a civil proceeding with the court exercising 
equitable powers. 
Nor does the court's interpretation of 78A-6-116(3) square with Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-
601, which requires district court judges to transfer minors' cases back to the juvenile courts 
unless they are involved in Serious Youth Offender or certification cases, and makes no 
mention of direct file minors' cases. That statute provides: 
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in 
another court, including a preliminary hearing, it is determined that the person 
charged is under 21 years of age and was less than 18 years of age at the time 
of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to the 
juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, and transcripts of any 
testimony except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth 
Offender statute] and 78A-6-703 [the Certification statute]. 
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to be taken 
immediately to the juvenile court or to a place of detention designated by the 
juvenile court, or shall release him to the custody of his parent or guardian or 
other person legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile 
court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then proceed as 
provided in this chapter. 
Our courts do have the obligation to resolve statutory conflicts and harmonize 
statutes by reading them together. See, e^ g., Board of Education of Jordan School District v. 
Sandy City Corporation, 2004 UT 37, ^  20, 94 P.3d 234. The trial court's efforts to do so 
failed to account for the legislature's enactment of the foregoing statutes. 
Moreover, the trial court's interpretive efforts exceeded proper judicial bounds. 
Courts do not have the ability to infer substantive statutory terms. See, e.g... Burns v. 
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Boyden, 2006 UT 14,116, 133 P.3d 370. Under the structure of the Utah Constitution, it is 
the function of the legislature to draft and enact specific and understandable laws, not the 
courts'. See Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1 and Article V § 1. The constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers logically requires the courts' fealty to the plain language of 
the laws enacted by the legislature. 
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a statute is 
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The courts owe 
fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a legislature says in the text of a 
statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. 
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the 
legislature. 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46.03. "The doctrine is fundamental.. .that in arriving 
at the intention of the Legislature the courts must give effect to the plain meaning of the 
language used to express the intention.... The plain and obvious meaning of the language 
must be adopted; anything else would be an unwarranted assumption of legislative 
authority." State v. Davis 184 P. 161, 165 (Utah 1919). Thus, the court was in error in 
rewriting subsection (3) of § 78A-6-116. 
When the legislature enacts an unconstitutional statute, it is the constitutional role of 
the courts to enforce the constitutions and strike the statute. See, e^g., Dean v. Rampton, 
556 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Utah 1976). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should strike the direct file statute on constitutional grounds and reverse 
the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss the information and case from adult 
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court. 
Respectfully submitted this. day of , 2009. 
By: 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
Ronaft, 
Earl X: 
ElizabethvlHunt 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to 
the Criminal Appeals Division of the Utah Attorney General's Office, 160 East 300 South, 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION UPHOLDING CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF DIRECT FILING STATUTE 
HUB mxtmr mum 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Judicial District 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH - W \ 5 200S 
s
^
T
^ c o u w v 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ^^SST 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : CASE NO. 091900608FS 
RICKY ANGILAU, JUDGE VERNICE TREASE 
Defendant 
Defendant Ricky Angilau submitted a Motion to Dismiss Information for Lack of 
Jurisdiction. The State filed a memorandum in opposition and Defendant submitted reply 
memorandum. The motion was argued to the Court on April 6, 2009. Now, being fully advised, 
the Court rules as follows: 
BACKGROUND 
Defendant Ricky Angilau was arrested on January 21,2009 after allegedly firing a gun into 
a crowd and killing one boy. Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the alleged offense. He was 
charged with murder and other offenses under Utah's direct-file statute, Section 78A-6-701. 
Defendant moves this Court to declare the direct file statute unconstitutional and dismiss the criminal 
Information for lack of jurisdiction. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant argues that the direct-file statute cannot be harmonized with other statutes in 
Utah's Juvenile Court Act, Section 78A-6-101, etseq. Section 78A-6-116(3) provides that a minor 
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may be charged with a crime only under the Serious Youth Offender Act,1 the Certification Hearing 
statute,2 or a traffic violation. Because the direct-file statute expressly grants district courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over a minor charged by Information or indictment of murder, it necessarily permits a 
minor to be charged and convicted without the proceedings against the minor being initiated under 
the Serious Youth Offender Act or Certification Hearing statute. 
Defendant argues that based upon a plain reading of the statutes, there is a conflict between 
the requirements of Section 78A-6-116(3) and the exclusive jurisdiction granted to district courts 
under Section 78A-6-701. If Defendant's argument were correct and the legislature intended 
Section 78A-6-116(3) to require cases such as this to proceed in juvenile court, this interpretation 
of the statute would effectively render the direct-file statute inoperable. 
Because the Court "cannot presume that the legislature intended to create a conflict" Madsen 
v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086,1090 (Utah 1985), when presented with apparently inconsistent statutory 
provisions, the "statutes must be looked at together, in the light of established rules of statutory 
construction, with a view to reconciling any apparent conflict and giving each of them effect 
according to their purpose insofar as that can be accomplished." United States Smelting, Ref. & 
Mining Co. v. Nielsen, 437 P.2d 199,201 (Utah 1968) (Crockett, C.J., concurring). See also Board 
1
 The Serious Youth Offender Act requires that a youth 16 years or older must be 
charged by criminal Information for one of several enumerated felonies, excluding murder 
or aggravated murder. If the juvenile court finds probable cause and certain mitigating 
factors are absent, it must order the youth to be bound over in district court. Section 78A-
6-702. 
2
 The Certification Hearing statute provides that the prosecutor may file a criminal 
Information and move the juvenile court to certify to the district court a youth 14 years or 
older charged with a felony. If the juvenile court finds probable cause, it must conduct a 
preliminary hearing to determine whether it would be "contrary to the best interests of the 
minor or the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction." Section 78A-6-703. 
STATE V. ANGILAU PAGE 3 ORDER 
of Education of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, f20, 94 P.3d 234 (courts "have 
an obligation to harmonize alleged inconsistencies within and between statutes, avoiding conflicts 
when possible."). 
The legislative history of these statutes demonstrates that excluding Section 78A-6-701 as 
an exception under Section 78A-6-116(3) was not the result of inadvertence, but a conscious choice 
on the part of the legislature and, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not 
consider Section 78A-6-116(3) and Section 78A-6-701 to be in conflict. 
Unlike today, where the direct-file statute is a separate statute that grants district courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over minors charged with murder, in 1995 the language of the direct-file 
statute was included as a subsection in the statute that set forth the original jurisdiction of the 
juvenile courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16(l) (1995) ("The adult judicial system shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or 
indictment with . . . an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an 
adult."). See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-16(2)-(6) (1995) (establishing the original jurisdiction 
of the juvenile courts). At that time, Section 78-3 a-44, which was a precursor to Section 78 A-6-116, 
expressly included the direct-file language from Section 78-3a-16 in addition to the Serious Youth 
Offender Act and Certification Hearing statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-44(4) (1995) ("A child 
may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except as provided in Subsection 
78-3a-16(l)[, the direct-file statute], Section 78-3a-25, [the certification statute], or 78-3a-25.1[, the 
serious youth offender statute,] and in cases involving traffic violations."). 
In 1996, various provisions of the Juvenile Court Act were amended and re-numbered. 
Specifically, the direct-file language was removed from Section 78-3a-l 6(1) and enacted as a stand-
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alone statute setting forth the exclusive jurisdiction of the district courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
3a-601 (1996). At the same time, Section 78~3a-44 was re-numbered as Section 78-3a-515 and, 
importantly, reference to the direct-file statute was removed. From these legislative enactments, it 
appears that the legislature believed that by creating a stand-alone statute addressing the district 
court's exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving a minor charged with murder, it was no longer 
necessary to include the direct-file language in the newly re-numbered Section 78-3a-515. Finally, 
in 2008, Section 78-3a-515 was again re-numbered as Section 78A-6-116, and the direct-file statute 
was re-numbered as Section 78A-6-701. Based upon the foregoing legislative history, it is 
reasonable to conclude that, despite their apparent inconsistency, the legislature did not consider 
Section 78A-6-116 and Section 78A-6-701 to be in conflict. 
Pecause the Court is required to at least attempt to reconcile apparently inconsistent statutory 
provisions, and particularly in light of the fact that the legislature likely did not consider Section 
78A-6-116(3) and Section 78A-6-701 to be in conflict, the Court must seek an interpretation that, 
if possible, renders the statutes consistent without undermining the purposes for which they were 
enacted. Perhaps the easiest way to do this is to view Section 78A-6-116 as applying only to 
proceedings originating m the juvenile court. Section 78A-6-116(3) would be read as follows: "[In 
all cases over which the juvenile court has original jurisdiction, a] minor may not be charged with 
a crime or convicted in any court except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, and in 
cases involving traffic violations." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-116(3). This interpretation does not 
substantively alter Section 78A-6-116(3) and, because Section 78A-6-701 does not involve cases 
over which the juvenile court has original jurisdiction, it reconciles any apparent conflict with the 
direct-file statute. 
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Defendant next argues that the direct-file statute permits constitutionally excessive 
prosecutorial discretion because it fails to provide prosecutors with guidelines for determining 
whether to file a criminal Information for murder directly in district court or file a petition in j uvenile 
court. In 1995, the Utah Supreme Court held that the previous version of the direct-file statute 
violated the Utah Constitution's Uniform Operations of Law clause because it permitted identical 
offenses to be brought either to the district court or juvenile court. State v. Molii, 901 P.2d 991 
(Utah 1995). The Mohi Court invalidated the portion of the direct-file statute that gave the 
prosecutor unfettered discretion as to where to file the juvenile's charge of murder. Following Mohi, 
the Utah legislature modified the direct-file statute and removed the discretionary language. 
Defendant argues that the current statute still grants excessive prosecutorial discretion. This 
Court agrees with the State's reading of the direct-file statute that a 16 or 17 year old charged with 
what would be murder if committed by an adult must be brought directly to the district court. The 
prosecution's only discretion is the legitimate choice of which charge or charges to file based upon 
a consideration of the evidence. This traditional type of discretion has been repeatedly upheld as 
constitutional. The direct-file statute simply permits the prosecutor to select "a charge to fit the 
circumstances of a defendant [This] requires a legal determination on the part of the prosecutor 
as to which elements of an offense can likely be proved at trial." Id. at 1003. According to Mohi, 
it is this "charging decision that is protected by traditional notions of prosecutor discretion," Id. 
Absent a showing of selective prosecution, which is not constitutionally protected, see United States 
v. Batchelden 442 U.S. 114, 125 (U.S. 1979) ("Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is, 
of course, subject to constitutional constraints."), the prosecutorial discretion allowed by the direct-
file statute is no different than the prosecutor's traditional exercise of discretion in any criminal case 
STATE V. ANGILAU PAGE 6 ORDER 
and is pot, therefore, constitutionally impermissible. 
Defendant also raises several challenges to the constitutionality of the direct-file statute, 
including arguments based upon due process, equal protection, unnecessary rigor, and policy 
considerations. Each of these arguments fail for the simple reason that the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "juveniles have no constitutional right to be tried as juveniles." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1005 
(citing State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390,399 (Utah 1989)). As noted in Mohl when persons are "properly 
charged in adult court in the first place, [they] . . . have no state due process right to a hearing to 
determine whether they can be retained as adults for trial. [T]he state is not required to give juvenile 
status to anyone." Id Because Defendant has no constitutional '"right' to juvenile treatment, [he] 
cannot claim that [his] juvenile status was unconstitutionally removed by the legislature." Id. Thus, 
his constitutional arguments are necessarily unavailing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that Defendant has not demonstrated that Utah5 s 
direct-file statute, Section 78A-6-701, is in conflict with the remaining sections of the Juvenile Court 
Act, Section 78A-6-101, etseq., nor does it violate Constitutional principles. Accordingly, the Court 
denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Information for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
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Addendum B 
CURRENT DIRECT FILE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701 (2009) 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age 
or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor has been 
previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This Subsection 
(1) (b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under this section, 
it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all offenses joined with the 
qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same 
criminal episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the 
minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over which the 
district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or (2) shall be tried against the defendant 
as an adult in the district court or justice court having jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of not 
guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 
78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any 
authority previously exercised over the minor. 
Addendum C 
DIRECT FILE STATUTE IN EFFECT AT TIME OF MOHI 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25 (1993) 
(1) (a) If the petition in the case of a juvenile 14 years of age or older alleges he committed 
an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, and if the court after full 
investigation and a hearing finds that it would be contrary to the best interests of the 
juvenile or of the public to retain jurisdiction, the court may enter an order certifying that 
finding and directing that the juvenile be held for criminal proceedings in the district court 
and that a hearing be held before a committing magistrate as in other felony cases. 
(b) The provisions of Section 78-3a-35 and other provisions relating to 
proceedings in juvenile's cases are applicable to the hearing held under this 
section to the extent they are pertinent. 
(2) In considering whether or not to waive jurisdiction over the juvenile, the juvenile court 
shall consider the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the 
community requires isolation of the juvenile beyond that afforded by 
juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the juvenile in concert 
with two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the 
juvenile to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater 
weight being given to offenses against persons; 
(e) the maturity of the juvenile as determined by considerations of his home, 
environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the juvenile; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the juvenile by use of facilities available 
to the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the juvenile uses a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
0 whether the juvenile possesses a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(3) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (2) is 
discretionary with the court. 
(4) The juvenile court judge may enter an order certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an 
adult upon making a finding of any one or more of those factors set forth in Subsection 
(2). 
(5) (a) The certification hearing is a dispositional proceeding, and while the juvenile court 
may hear evidence of the crime to establish there is a reasonable relationship between the 
charge and the juvenile, the court need not hold a preliminary hearing to establish probable 
cause that the juvenile committed the offense. 
(b) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, 
physical, educational, and social history shall be considered by the court, but 
the court, if requested by the juvenile, his parent, guardian, or other 
interested party, shall require the person, if reasonably available, or agency 
preparing the report and other material to appear and be subject to both 
direct and cross-examination. 
(6) (a) When a petition in the case of a juvenile 16 years of age or older alleges any class of 
criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, or any other offense that would be a 
capital offense or a first degree felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court except under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) If an indictment on the charge is returned by a grand jury or a criminal 
information is filed by a county attorney or district attorney, the juvenile 
court is divested of jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-16. The charge shall be 
made and the proceedings regarding the charge shall be conducted in every 
respect as if the juvenile were an adult. A copy of the information or 
indictment shall be filed forthwith in the juvenile court as notice to that 
court. 
(7) When a juvenile has been certified to the adult judicial system or when a criminal 
information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a committing 
magistrate charging the juvenile with an offense under Subsection (6), the jurisdiction of 
the Division of Youth Corrections is terminated, and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
over the juvenile is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 
same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, 
except as provided in Subsections (9) and (10). 
(8) (a) Upon conviction a judge, may impose the penalties set forth in the criminal code or 
with the approval of the Division of Youth Corrections, the judge may commit the juvenile 
to the care, custody, and jurisdiction of the Division of Youth Corrections under the 
conditions specified by the division. 
(b) A juvenile maybe convicted under this section on the charges filed or on 
any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode. 
(9) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-16 and the Division of Youth Corrections 
regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when: 
(a) a magistrate determines there is insufficient probable cause for the 
juvenile to stand trial on the allegation or amended allegation; 
(b) there is an acquittal or finding of not guilty or dismissal of the charges; or 
(c) the matter is recalled under Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) The juvenile or his parents, guardian, or custodian may request a hearing in juvenile 
court to recall jurisdiction to the juvenile court by filing a motion in the juvenile court. The 
motion shall be filed within ten calendar days from the date of the filing of the information. 
Upon receiving the motion, the juvenile court has jurisdiction to conduct a hearing and rule 
upon the motion to recall juvenile court jurisdiction. A hearing shall be held on the request 
within 15 calendar days of the filing. 
(b) In determining whether or not to recall jurisdiction the juvenile court 
judge shall consider: 
(i) the juvenile's chronological age; 
(ii) the juvenile s legal record; and 
(iii) the seriousness of the charge. 
(c) The juvenile court judge may deny the motion upon a finding of one or 
more of the factors listed in Subsection (10) (b). 
(d) If the juvenile court recalls jurisdiction under this subsection, the juvenile 
shall be returned to the juvenile court for further proceedings, which may 
include certification. 
Addendum D 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 9 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 24 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I §27 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of 
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of the 
State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2)(a)(i) The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the conditions, in the 
manner, and within the time provided by statute, may. 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for 
adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; 
or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds 
vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the 
voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or prohibit 
the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be adopted upon 
approval of two-thirds of those voting, 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in 
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may. 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county, 
city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as 
provided by statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or 
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or 
ordinance may take effect. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 26 
No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be applicable. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. §62A-7-104 (2009) 
(1) The division is responsible for all youth offenders committed to it by juvenile courts 
for secure confinement or supervision and treatment in the community. 
(2) The division shall: 
(a) establish and administer a continuum of community, secure, and nonsecure programs 
for all youth offenders committed to the division; 
(b) establish and maintain all detention and secure facilities and set minimum standards for 
those facilities; 
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(c) establish and operate prevention and early intervention youth services programs for 
nonadjudicated youth placed with the division; and 
(d) establish observation and assessment programs necessary to serve youth offenders 
committed by the juvenile court for short-term observation under Subsection 
78A-6-117(2)(e), and whenever possible, conduct the programs in settings separate and 
distinct from secure facilities for youth offenders. 
(3) The division shall place youth offenders committed to it in the most appropriate program 
for supervision and treatment. 
(4) In any order committing a youth offender to the division, the juvenile court shall specify 
whether the youth offender is being committed for secure confinement or placement in a 
community-based program. The division shall place the youth offender in the most 
appropriate program within the category specified by the court. 
(5) The division shall employ staff necessary to: 
(a) supervise and control youth offenders in secure facilities or in the community; 
(b) supervise and coordinate treatment of youth offenders committed to the division for 
placement in community-based programs; and 
(c) control and supervise nonadjudicated youth placed with the division for temporary 
services in receiving centers, youth services, and other programs established by the division. 
(6) Youth in the custody or temporary custody of the division are controlled or detained in a 
manner consistent with public safety and rules promulgated by the division. In the event of 
an unauthorized leave from a secure facility, detention center, community-based program, 
receiving center, home, or any other designated placement, division employees have the 
authority and duty to locate and apprehend the youth, or to initiate action with local law 
enforcement agencies for assistance. 
(7) The division shall establish and operate compensatory-service work programs for youth 
offenders committed to the division by the juvenile court. The compensatory-service work 
program shall: 
(a) provide labor to help in the operation, repair, and maintenance of public facilities, 
parks, highways, and other programs designated by the division; 
(b) provide educational and prevocational programs in cooperation with the State Board of 
Education for youth offenders placed in the program; and 
(c) provide counseling to youth offenders. 
(8) The division shall establish minimum standards for the operation of all private residential 
and nonresidential rehabilitation facilities which provide services to juveniles who have 
committed a delinquent act, in this state or in any other state. 
(9) In accordance with policies established by the board, the division shall provide regular 
training for staff of secure facilities, detention staff, case management staff, and staff of the 
community-based programs. 
(10) (a) The division is authorized to employ special function officers, as defined in Section 
53-13-105, to locate and apprehend minors who have absconded from division custody, 
transport minors taken into custody pursuant to division policy, investigate cases, and carry 
out other duties as assigned by the division. 
(b) Special function officers maybe employed through contract with the Department of 
Public Safety, any P.O.S.T. certified law enforcement agency, or directly hired by the 
division. 
(11) The division shall designate employees to obtain the saliva DNA specimens required 
under Section 53-10-403. The division shall ensure that the designated employees receive 
appropriate training and that the specimens are obtained in accordance with accepted 
protocolr 
(12) The division shall register with the Department of Corrections any person who: 
(a) has been adjudicated delinquent based on an offense listed in Subsection 
77-27-21.5(l)(n)Q; 
(b) has been committed to the division for secure confinement; and 
(c) remains in the division's custody 30 days prior to the person!s 21st birthday 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 (2009) 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a 
court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority 
to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees 
or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, oven 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by 
the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of 
the Division of Forestry Fire, and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States 
or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the 
Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or 
capital felony, 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony 
or capital felony, 
Q orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative 
subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which 
the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record 
involving a charge of a capital felony 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3) (a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25 (1993) 
(1) (a) If the petition in the case of a juvenile 14 years of age or older alleges he committed an 
act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, and if the court after full 
investigation and a hearing finds that it would be contrary to the best interests of the juvenile 
or of the public to retain jurisdiction, the court may enter an order certifying that finding and 
directing that the juvenile be held for criminal proceedings in the district court and that a 
hearing be held before a committing magistrate as in other felony cases. 
(b) The provisions of Section 78-3a-35 and other provisions relating to 
proceedings in juvenile's cases are applicable to the hearing held under this 
section to the extent they are pertinent. 
(2) In considering whether or not to waive jurisdiction over the juvenile, the juvenile court 
shall consider the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the 
community requires isolation of the juvenile beyond that afforded by juvenile 
facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the juvenile in concert with 
two or more persons under circumstances which would subject the juvenile to 
enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated, or willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight 
being given to offenses against persons; 
(e) the maturity of the juvenile as determined by considerations of his home, 
environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the juvenile; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the juvenile by use of facilities available 
to the juvenile court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the juvenile uses a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
(j) whether the juvenile possesses a dangerous weapon on or about school 
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(3) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (2) is 
discretionary with the court. 
(4) The juvenile court judge may enter an order certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult 
upon making a finding of any one or more of those factors set forth in Subsection (2). 
(5) (a) The certification hearing is a dispositional proceeding, and while the juvenile court 
may hear evidence of the crime to establish there is a reasonable relationship between the 
charge and the juvenile, the court need not hold a preliminary hearing to establish probable 
cause that the juvenile committed the offense. 
(b) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, 
physical, educational, and social history shall be considered by the court, but 
the court, if requested by the juvenile, his parent, guardian, or other interested 
party, shall require the person, if reasonably available, or agency preparing the 
report and other material to appear and be subject to both direct and 
cross- examination. 
(6) (a) When a petition in the case of a juvenile 16 years of age or older alleges any class of 
criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, or any other offense that would be a capital 
offense or a first degree felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court except under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) If an indictment on the charge is returned by a grand jury or a criminal 
information is filed by a county attorney or district attorney, the juvenile court 
is divested of jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-16. The charge shall be made 
and the proceedings regarding the charge shall be conducted in every respect 
as if the juvenile were an adult. A copy of the information or indictment shall 
be filed forthwith in the juvenile court as notice to that court. 
(7) "When a juvenile has been certified to the adult judicial system or when a criminal 
information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a committing 
magistrate charging the juvenile with an offense under Subsection (6), the jurisdiction of the 
Division of Youth Corrections is terminated, and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over 
the juvenile is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, except 
as provided in Subsections (9) and (10). 
(8) (a) Upon conviction a judge, may impose the penalties set forth in the criminal code or 
with the approval of the Division of Youth Corrections, the judge may commit the juvenile 
to the care, custody, and jurisdiction of the Division of Youth Corrections under the 
conditions specified by the division. 
(b) A juvenile maybe convicted under this section on the charges filed or on 
any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode. 
(9) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-16 and the Division of Youth Corrections regain 
jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when: 
(a) a magistrate determines there is insufficient probable cause for the juvenile 
to stand trial on the allegation or amended allegation; 
(b) there is an acquittal or finding of not guilty or dismissal of the charges; or 
(c) the matter is recalled under Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) The juvenile or his parents, guardian, or custodian may request a hearing in juvenile 
court to recall jurisdiction to the juvenile court by filing a motion in the juvenile court. The 
motion shall be filed within ten calendar days from the date of the filing of the information. 
Upon receiving the motion, the juvenile court has jurisdiction to conduct a hearing and rule 
upon the motion to recall juvenile court jurisdiction. A hearing shall be held on the request 
within 15 calendar days of the filing. 
(b) In determining whether or not to recall jurisdiction the juvenile court judge 
shall consider: 
(i) the juvenile's chronological age; 
(u) the juvenile's legal record; and 
(iii) the seriousness of the charge. 
(c) The juvenile court judge may deny the motion upon a finding of one or 
more of the factors listed in Subsection (10) (b). 
(d) If the juvenile court recalls jurisdiction under this subsection, the juvenile 
shall be returned to the juvenile court for further proceedings, which may 
include certification. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102 (2009) 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in 
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of lawyer discipline consistent with the 
rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over all matters properly filed in the circuit court prior 
to July 1,1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction over judgments and orders of the justice court 
as outlined in Section 78A-7-118 and small claims appeals filed pursuant to Section 
78A-8-106. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district court are under 
Sections 78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review: 
(a) agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings; and 
(b) municipal administrative proceedings in accordance with Section 10-3-703.7. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has subject matter jurisdiction in class 
B misdemeanors, class C misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the offense occurred within the boundaries of the municipality in which the district 
courthouse is located and that municipality has not formed, or formed and then dissolved, 
a justice court; or 
(c) they are included in an indictment or information covering a single criminal episode 
alleging the commission of a felony or a class A misdemeanor. 
(9) If the district court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection~(5) or fS^ir also 
has jurisdiction over offenses listed in Section 78A-7-106 even if those offenses are 
committed by a person 16 years of age or older. 
(10) The district court has jurisdiction of actions under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, Child 
Protective Orders, if the juvenile court transfers the case to the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-102 (2009) 
(1) There is established for the state a juvenile court. 
(2) The juvenile court is a court of record. It shall have a seal, and its judges, clerks, and 
referees have the power to administer oaths and affirmations. 
(3) The juvenile court is of equal status with the district courts of the state. 
(4) The juvenile court is established as a forum for the resolution of all matters properly 
brought before it, consistent with applicable constitutional and statutory requirements of due 
process. 
(5) The purpose of the court under this chapter is to: 
(a) promote public safety and individual accountability by the imposition of appropriate 
sanctions on persons who have committed acts in violation of law; 
(b) order appropriate measures to promote guidance and control, preferably in the minors 
own home, as an aid in the prevention of future unlawful conduct and the development of 
responsible citizenship; 
(c) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment for persons who 
have committed acts bringing them within the court's jurisdiction; 
(d) adjudicate matters that relate to minors who are beyond parental or adult control and to 
establish appropriate* authority over these minors by means of placement and control 
orders; 
(e) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected, and dependent children and to 
provide care and protection for minors by placement, protection, and custody orders; 
(f) remove a minor from parental custody only where the minor's safety or welfare, or the 
public safety, may not otherwise be adequately safeguarded; and 
(g) consistent with the ends of justice, act in the best interests of the minor in all cases and 
preserve and strengthen family ties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-103 (2009) 
(1) Except as otherwise provided bylaw, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction 
in proceedings concerning: 
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance or a 
person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law or ordinance before 
becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the violation occurred, excluding offenses in 
Subsection 78A-7-106(2); 
(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or refused to comply with an order of 
the juvenile court to pay a fine or restitution, if the order was imposed prior to the person's 
21st birthday, however, the continuing jurisdiction is limited to causing compliance with 
existing orders; 
(c) a child who is an abused child, neglected child, or dependent child, as those terms are 
defined in Section 78A-6-105; 
(d) a protective order for a child pursuant to the provisions of Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, 
Child Protective Orders, which the juvenile court may transfer to the district court if the 
juvenile court has entered an ex parte protective order and finds that: 
(i) the petitioner and the respondent are the natural parent, adoptive parent, or step 
parent of the child who is the object of the petition; 
(u) the district court has a petition pending or an order related to custody or parent-time 
entered under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant 
Abuse Act, or Title 78B, Chapter 15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act, in which the 
petitioner and the respondent are parties; and 
(iii) the best interests of the child will be better served in the district court; 
(e) appointment of a guardian of the person or other guardian of a minor who comes 
within the court's jurisdiction under other provisions of this section; 
(f) the emancipation of a minor in accordance with Part 8, Emancipation; 
(g) the termination of the legal parent-child relationship in accordance with Part 5, 
Termination of Parental Rights Act, including termination of residual parental rights and 
duties; 
(h) the treatment or commitment of a mentally retarded minor, 
(i) a minor who is a habitual truant from school; 
0 the judicial consent to the marriage of a child under age 16 upon a determination of 
voluntariness or where otherwise required bylaw, employment, or enlistment of a child 
when consent is required bylaw; 
(k) any parent or parents of a child committed to a secure youth corrections facility, to 
order, at the discretion of the court and on the recommendation of a secure facility, the 
parent or parents of a child committed to a secure facility for a custodial term, to undergo 
group rehabilitation therapy under the direction of a secure facility therapist, who has 
supervision of that parent's or parents' child, or any other therapist the court may direct, 
for a period directed by the court as recommended by a secure facility, 
(3) a minor underTitfe 55, Qiapter 12, Interstate Compact for Juveniles? 
(m) the treatment or commitment of a mentally ill child. The court may commit a child to 
the physical custody of a local mental health authority in accordance with the procedures 
and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 15, Part 7, Commitment of Persons Under Age 18 
to Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health, but not directly to the Utah State 
Hospital; 
(n) the commitment of a child in accordance with Section 62A-15-301; 
(o) de novo review of final agency actions resulting from an informal adjudicative 
proceeding as provided in Section 63G-4-402; and 
(p) adoptions conducted in accordance with the procedures described in Title 78B, Chapter 
6, Part 1, Utah Adoption Act, when the juvenile court has previously entered an order 
terminating the rights of a parent and finds that adoption is in the best interest of the child. 
(2) Notwithstanding Section 78A-7-106 and Subsection 78A-5-102(9), the juvenile court has 
exclusive jurisdiction over the following offenses committed by a child: 
(a) Title 41, Chapter 6a, Part 5, Driving Under the Influence and Reckless Driving; 
(b) Section 73-18-12, reckless operation; and 
(c) class B and C misdemeanors, infractions, or violations of ordinances that are part of a 
single criminal episode filed in a petition that contains an offense over which the court has 
jurisdiction. 
(3) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over an ungovernable or runaway child who is referred 
to it by the Division of Child and Family Services or by public or private agencies that 
contract with the division to provide services to that child where, despite earnest and 
persistent efforts by the division or agency, the child has demonstrated that the child: 
(a) is beyond the control of the child's parent, guardian, lawful custodian, or school 
authorities to the extent that the child's behavior or condition endangers the child's own 
welfare or the welfare of others; or 
(b) has run away from home. 
(4) This section does not restrict the right of access to the juvenile court by private agencies 
or other persons. 
(5) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of all magistrate functions relative to cases arising 
under Section 78A-6-702. 
(6) The juvenile court has jurisdiction to make a finding of substantiated, unsubstantiated, or 
without merit, in accordance with Section 78A-6-323. 
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of matters transferred to it by another trial court 
pursuant to Subsection 78A-7-106(7), 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-1U (2009) 
(1) Any person required to appear who, without reasonable cause, fails to appear maybe 
proceeded against for contempt of court, and the court may cause a bench warrant to issue 
to produce the person in court. 
(2) In all cases when a minor is required to appear in court, the parents, guardian, or other 
person with legal custody of the minor shall appear with the minor unless excused by the 
judge. 
(a) An employee may request permission to leave the workplace for the purpose of 
attending court if the employee has been notified by the juvenile court that his minor is 
required to appear before the court. 
(b) An employer must grant permission to leave the workplace with or without pay if the 
employee has requested permission at least seven days in advance or within 24 hours of the 
employee receiving notice of the hearing. 
(3) If a parent or other person who signed a written promise to appear and bring the child to 
court under Section 78A-6-112 or 78A-6-113 fails to appear and bring the child to court on 
the date set in the promise, or, if the date was to be set, after notification by the court, a 
warrant maybe issued for the apprehension of that person or the child, or both. 
(4) "Willful failure to perform the promise is a misdemeanor if, at the time of the execution of 
the promise, the promisor is given a copy of the promise which clearly states that failure to 
appear and have the child appear as promised is a misdemeanor. The juvenile court shall 
have jurisdiction to proceed against the promisor in adult proceedings pursuant to Part 10, 
Adult Offenses. 
(5) The court shall endeavor, through use of the warrant of arrest if necessary, as provided in 
Subsection (6), or by other means, to ensure the presence at all hearings of one or both 
parents or of the guardian of a child. If neither a parent nor guardian is present at the court 
proceedings, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interest of a minor. A 
guardian ad litem may also be appointed whenever necessary for the welfare of a minor, 
whether or not a parent or guardian is present. 
(6) A warrant may be issued for a parent, a guardian, a custodian, or a minor if: 
(a) a summons is issued but cannot be served; 
(b) it is made to appear to the court that the person to be served will not obey the 
summons; 
(c) serving the summons will be ineffectual; or 
(d) the welfare of the minor requires that he be brought immediately into the custody of 
the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-U6 (2009) 
(1) Except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, proceedings in a minor's 
case shall be regarded as a civil proceeding with the court exercising equitable powers. 
(2) An adjudication by a juvenile court that a minor is within its jurisdiction under Section 
78A-6-103 is not considered a conviction of a crime, except in cases involving traffic 
violations. An adjudication may not operate to impose any civil disabilities upon the minor 
nor to disqualify the minor for any civil service or military service or appointment. 
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except as provided 
in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, and in cases involving traffic violations. When a 
petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the minor may not later be subjected to 
criminal prosecution based on the same facts except as provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 
78A-6-703. 
(4) An adjudication by a juvenile court that a minor is within its jurisdiction under Section 
78A-6-103 is considered a conviction for the purposes of determining the level of offense 
for which a minor maybe charged and enhancing the level of an offense in the juvenile 
court. A prior adjudication maybe used to enhance the level or degree of an offense 
committed by an adult only as otherwise specifically provided. 
(5) Abstracts of court records for all adjudications of traffic violations shall be submitted to 
the Department of Public Safety as provided in Section 53-3-218. 
(6) Information necessary to collect unpaid fines, fees, assessments, bail, or restitution may 
be forwarded to employers, financial institutions, law enforcement, constables, the Office 
of Recovery Services, or other agencies for purposes of enforcing the order as provided in 
Section 78A-6-117. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-601 (2009) 
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in another court, 
including a preliminary hearing, it is determined that the person charged is under 21 years 
of age and was less than 18 years of age at the time of committing the alleged offense, that 
court shall transfer the case to the juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, 
and transcripts of any testimony except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703. 
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to be taken immediately to the 
juvenile court or to a place of detention designated by the juvenile court, or shall release 
him to the custody of his parent or guardian or other person legally responsible for him, to 
be brought before the juvenile court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then 
proceed as provided in mis chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-603 (2009) 
(1) As used in this section, "citation" means an abbreviated referral and is sufficient to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court in lieu of a petition. 
(2) A citation shall be submitted to the court within five days of its issuance. 
(3) Each copy of the citation shall contain: 
(a) the name and address of the juvenile court before which the minor is to appear; 
(b) the name of the minor cited; 
(c) the statute or local ordinance that is alleged to have been violated; 
(d) a brief description of the offense charged; 
(e) the date, time, and location at which the offense is alleged to have occurred; 
(f) the date the citation was issued; 
(g) the name and badge or identification number of the peace officer or public official who 
issued the citation; 
(h) the name of the arresting person if an arrest was made by a private party and the 
citation was issued in lieu of taking the arrested minor into custody as provided in Section 
78A-6-112; 
(i) the date and time when the minor is to appear, or a statement that the minor and parent 
or legal guardian are to appear when notified by the juvenile court; and 
0 the signature of the minor and the parent or legal guardian, if present, agreeing to appear 
at the juvenile court as designated on the citation. 
(4) Each copy of the citation shall contain space for the following inf onnation to be entered 
if known: 
(a) the minor's address; 
(b) the minor's date of birth; 
(c) the name and address of the child's custodial parent or legal guardian, if different from 
the child; and 
(d) if there is a victim, the victim's name, address, and an estimate of loss, except that this 
information shall be removed from the documents the minor receives. 
(5) A citation received by the court beyond the time designated in Subsection (2) shall 
include a written explanation for the delay. 
(6) The following offenses maybe sent to the juvenile court as a citation: 
(a) violations of wildlife laws; 
(b) violations of boating laws; 
(c) violations of curfew laws; 
(d) any class B misdemeanor or less traffic violations where the person is under the age of 
16; 
(e) any class B or class C misdemeanor or infraction; 
(f) any other infraction or misdemeanor as designated by general order of the Board of 
Juvenile Court Judges; and 
(g) violations of Section 76-10-105 subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. 
(7) A preliminary inquiry is not required unless requested by the court. 
(8) The provisions of Subsection (5) may not apply to a runaway, ungovernable, or habitually 
truant child. 
(9) In the case of Section 76-10-105 violations committed on school property when a citation 
is issued under this section, the peace officer, public official, or compliance officer shall issue 
one copy to the minor cited, provide the parent or legal guardian with a copy, and file a 
duplicate with the juvenile court specified in the citation within five days. 
(10) (a) A minor receiving a citation described in this section shall appear at the juvenile court 
designated in the citation on the time and date specified in the citation or when notified by 
the juvenile court. 
(b) A citation may not require a minor to appear sooner than five days following its 
issuance. 
(11) A minor who receives a citation and willfully fails to appear before the juvenile court 
pursuant to a citation is subject to arrest and maybe found in contempt of court. The court 
mayproceed against the minor as provided in Section 78A-6-1101 regardless of the 
disposition of the offense upon which the minor was originally cited. 
(12) When a citation is issued under this section, bail maybe posted and forfeited under 
Subsection 78A-6-113(12) with the consent of: 
(a) the court; and 
(b) if the minor is a child, the parent or legal guardian of the child cited. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701 (2009) 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of 
age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor has been 
previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This Subsection 
(l)(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under this section, 
it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all offenses joined with the 
qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same 
criminal episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the 
minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over which the 
district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or (2) shall be tried against the defendant 
as an adult in the district court or justice court having jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of not 
guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 
78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any 
authority previously exercised over the minor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-702 (2009) 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging a 
minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in 
the juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving intentionally causing serious 
bodily injury to another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary, 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery, 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder, or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder, or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been 
previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon 
which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection (1) 
shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the state 
shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish 
probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall 
have the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3), 
the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district 
court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that all of the 
following conditions exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the minor appears 
to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent, aggressive, or 
premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3) as to a showing of probable 
cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and presenting evidence as to 
the existence of the above conditions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that all the above 
conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for 
trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile 
petition. 
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the state has 
not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over under 
Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor and 
shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue. The 
defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be 
advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in 
accordance with Title 71\ Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section,- the 
preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of 
probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the 
defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section 
regarding the additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information or 
indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more charges under 
this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any subsequent 
misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with those 
charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been 
committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over 
to the district court to answer for those charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this section 
or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a preliminary 
examination in the district court. 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previously 
been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon, or is 
16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need to be 
proven at trial in the district court. 
(10) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any other 
offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over the 
minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(11) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-703 (2009) 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges the 
commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile 
court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At die preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case 
and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed 
it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of 
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or of 
the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, and 
may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires 
isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with two or more 
persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under 
Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or 
willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given 
to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment, 
emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the juvenile 
court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 
minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the 
district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
0 whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as 
provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is 
discretionary with the court. 
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical, 
educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, the 
court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear 
and be subject to both direct and cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the statefs case, the minor may testify under oath, call witnesses, 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by Subsection 
(3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may enter 
an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the 
juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-115, Section 78A-6-1111, and other provisions relating 
to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to the 
extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court 
is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same right to 
bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a 
criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a 
committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section 78A-6-702, 
the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 
same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, 
except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any other 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over 
the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78 A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-704 (2009) 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges the 
commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile 
court shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case 
and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed 
it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of 
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or of 
the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, and 
may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires 
isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with two or more 
persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under 
Section 76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or 
willful manner; 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given 
to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment, 
emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(f) the record and previous history of the minor, 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the juvenile 
court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the 
minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in-the 
district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
0 whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as 
provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is 
discretionary with the court. 
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical, 
educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, the 
court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear 
and be subject to both direct and cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call witnesses, 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the faaors required by Subsection 
(3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may enter 
an order. 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the 
juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall 
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-115, Section 78A-6-1111, and other provisions relating 
to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to the 
extent they are pertinent. 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court 
is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same right to 
bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a 
criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a 
committing magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section 78A-6-702, 
the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court over the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the 
same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, 
except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any other 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over 
the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice 
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there 
is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-104 (2009) 
(1) A minor may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) an order of the juvenile court binding the minor over to the district court as a serious 
youth offender pursuant to Section 78A-6-702; or 
(b) an order of the juvenile court, after certification proceedings pursuant to Section 
78A-6-703, directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
(2) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) an order of the juvenile court that a minor charged as a serious youth offender pursuant 
to Section 78A-6-702 be held for trial in the juvenile court; or 
(b) a refusal by the juvenile court, after certification proceedings pursuant to Section 
78A-6-703, to order that a minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-106 (2009) 
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of 
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction by a person 18 
years of age or older. 
(2) Except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, justice 
courts have jurisdiction over the following class B and C misdemeanors, violation of 
ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction by a person 16 
years of age or olden 
(a) Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code of Utah; 
(b) Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act; 
(c) Title 41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code; 
(d) Title 41, Chapter 12a, Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act; 
(e) Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-Highway Vehicles; 
(f) Title 73, Chapter 18, Safe Boating Act; 
(g) Title 73, Chapter 18a, Boating—Litter and Pollution Control; 
(h) Title 73, Chapter 18b, Water Safety, and 
(i) Title 73, Chapter 18c, Financial Responsibility of Motorboat Owners and Operators Act. 
(3) Justice Courts have jurisdiction over class C misdemeanor violations of Title 53, Chapter 
3, Part 2, Driver Licensing Act. 
(4) As used in this section, "the court's jurisdiction" means the territorial jurisdiction of a 
justice court. 
(5) An offense is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a justice court if: 
(a) conduct constituting an element of the offense or a result constituting an element of the 
offense occurs within the court's jurisdiction, regardless of whether the conduct or result is 
itself unlawful; 
(b) either a person committing an offense or a victim of an offense is located within the 
court's jurisdiction at the time the offense is committed; 
(c) either a cause of injury occurs within the court's jurisdiction or the injury occurs within 
the court's jurisdiction; 
(d) a person commits any act constituting an element of an inchoate offense within the 
court's jurisdiction, including an agreement in a conspiracy, 
(e) a person solicits, aids, or abets, or attempts to solicit, aid, or abet another person in the 
planning or commission of an offense within the court's jurisdiction; 
(f) the investigation of the offense does not readily indicate in which court's jurisdiction the 
offense occurred, and: 
(i) the offense is committed upon or in any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft 
passing within the court's jurisdiction; 
(ii) (A) the offense is committed on or in any body of water bordering on or within this 
state if the territorial limits of the justice court are adjacent to the body of water; and 
(B) as used in Subsection (3)(f)(ii)(A), "body of water" includes any stream, river, lake, 
or reservoir, whether natural or man-made; 
(iii) a person who commits theft exercises control over the affected property within the 
court's jurisdiction; or 
(iv) the offense is committed on or near the boundary of the court's jurisdiction; 
(g) the offense consists of an unlawful communication that was initiated or received within 
the court's jurisdiction; or 
(h) jurisdiction is otherwise specifically provided bylaw. 
(6) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78A, Chapter 8, Small 
Qaims Courts, if a defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the justice court. 
(7) A justice court judge may transfer a matter in which the defendant is a child to the 
juvenile court for further proceedings after judgment in the justice court. 
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BRETT L. TOLMAN, United States Attorney (#8821) 
VEDA M. TRAVIS, Assistant United States Attorney (#6449) 
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Attorneys for the United States of America 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSE MARTINEZ-ESQUIVEL, 
Defendant. 
CASE: 2:07CR00918 CW 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY ORDER OF 
FORFEITURE 
JUDGE: CLARK WADDOUPS 
The United States of America, by and through its undersigned 
counsel, pursuant to Fed R. Crim. P. Rule 32.2(b) respectfully 
submits its Motion for Preliminary Order of Forfeiture in the 
above entitled case for the reasons set forth in a Memorandum 
submitted herewith. 
Dated this 11th day of November, 2009. 
BRETT L. TOLMAN 
United States Attorney 
/s/ Cy H. Castle 
CY H. CASTLE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
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BRETT L. TOLMAN, United States Attorney (#8821) 
VEDA M. TRAVIS, Assistant United States Attorney (#6449) 
CY H. CASTLE, Assistant United States Attorney (#4808) 
Attorneys for the United States of America 
185 South State Street, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 524-5682 • Fax (801) 325-3310 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSE MARTINEZ-ESQUIVEL, 
Defendant. 
CASE: 2:07CR00918 CW 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY ORDER OF 
FORFEITURE 
JUDGE: CLARK WADDOUPS 
The United States of America has sought forfeiture of certain 
properties in the above captioned case and has moved the Court 
for a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture. The reasons for this 
Motion are set forth below. 
1. On June 30, 2009, the United States Attorney sitting in 
the District of Utah charged Jose Martinez-Esquivel with 
violation of Bulk Cash Smuggling, all in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 
5332 (a) . 
2. The Court's jurisdiction in this matter is founded in 28 
U.S.C. §1355. The United States brought forfeiture pursuant to 
31 U.S.C. § 5332. 
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3. On June 30, 2009, the defendant, Jose Martinez-Esquivel, 
pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the Information. As a result of a 
plea of guilty to Count 1 of the Information for which the 
government sought forfeiture, the defendant Jose Martinez-
Esquivel shall forfeit to the United States all property, real or 
personal, that is derived from, used, or intended to be used in 
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a), including but not limited to: 
• 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche Truck, VIN#: 3GNEK13T83G229268 
4. Forfeiture of the above named properties pursuant to 31 
U.S.C. § 5332, is appropriate based on the evidence presented on 
the Information filed on June 30, 2009, and the Statement in 
Advance of Plea filed on June 30, 2009. The United States, has 
established the requisite nexus between the property and the 
offenses. 
5. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 32.2(b) (3) of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the United States 
requests that it be permitted to undertake whatever discovery is 
necessary to identify, locate, or dispose of property subject to 
forfeiture. 
WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests that this 
Court enter an Order of Forfeiture, forfeiting to the United 
States the property described herein and in the Information, and 
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order of the United States Marshal Service to maintain custody of 
the forfeited properties and currency in accordance with the law. 
Dated this 11th day of November, 2009. 
BRETT L. TOLMAN 
United States Attorney 
/s/ Cy H. Castle 
CY H. CASTLE 
Assistant United States Attorney 
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